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Industrial Pluralism
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court, in its interpretation of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA),' has adopted a model of class relations, the ramifica-
tions of which are beginning to permeate other branches of federal law.
This model has evolved doctrinally from the decision of Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills,2 which authorized the creation of a federal com-
mon law of collective bargaining agreements. Its substance is derived from
the human relations school of industrial sociology. This model, which I
shall call "industrial pluralism," is both a descriptive and a prescriptive
vision of class relations in industrial society.
Industrial pluralism is the view that collective bargaining is self-govern-
ment by management and labor: management and labor are considered to
be equal parties who jointly determine the conditions of the sale of labor
power. The collective bargaining process is said to function like a legisla-
ture in which management and labor, both sides representing their sepa-
rate constituencies, engage in debate and compromise, and together legis-
late the rules under which the workplace will be governed. The set of
rules that results is alternatively called a statute or a constitution-the
basic industrial pluralist metaphors for the collective bargaining
agreement.
This model of collective bargaining is the lens through which all issues
that involve class relations have come to be viewed. As with any pair of
lenses habitually worn, the distortions it causes have been long forgotten.
The thesis of this article is that the industrial pluralist view of labor rela-
tions is based upon a false assumption: the assumption that management
and labor have equal power in the workplace. Thus the model is a false
description; that is, a set of prism glasses that distorts rather than clarifies
the industrial world. As a false description, industrial pluralism obscures
the real issues and problems posed by the exercise of power in the work-
place, issues that the courts are now increasingly forced to confront. With
increased government intervention in employment relations, industrial
pluralism is proving to be an ill-suited analytic tool for the solution of the
problems that arise. The internal contradictions within the model are sur-
facing, and the implications of the model, previously merely latent, are
coming to light.
A. The Long View of American Labor Law
The history of labor relations law in this country can be viewed as a
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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300-year-long debate over the proper level of government intervention in
the relationship between employers and employees. In the colonial era,
many features of the wage bargain were set by statute.' In the nineteenth
century, however, the wage contract was redefined to be a private ar-
rangement between two individuals-a seller and a buyer of a ser-
vice-not amenable to legislative intervention.4 The transaction, in this
view, was no different from any other transaction between private individ-
uals, and the role of law was merely to facilitate the transaction and to
provide remedies should either side fail to perform. This view culminated
in the case of Lochner v. New York,' in which the Supreme Court held
that it was a violation of due process for a state to pass a law regulating
maximum hours of work.
In 1935, the conception of appropriate state intervention in the work-
place was reversed again. Congress passed the Wagner Act,6 which gave
workers the right to organize unions and to bargain collectively with their
employers. Two years later, the Supreme Court held, in the case of West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,7 that a state may legislate minimum wages for
work. Those two events signaled the establishment of a new era-they
represented the high-water mark of government intervention in the em-
ployment relationship. They emerged from a conception of the wage bar-
gain as a matter of public concern, the terms of which affect society as a
whole!
Since 1937, debate over the proper level of government intervention has
developed along two tracks. On the one hand, a myriad of state and fed-
eral laws have been passed on the heels of West Coast Hotel, which regu-
late many aspects of the wage bargain, such as the minimum wage,'
3. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bay Colony Code of 1648, reprinted in READINGS IN AMERICAN LE,
GAL HISTORY 230 (M. Howe ed. 1949).
4. See, e.g., Millett v. People, 117 Il. 294, 7 N.E. 631 (1886) (state law requiring coal mine to
install scales for weighing coal and to pay miners tonnage rates violated due process by interfering
with freedom of contract); Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 59 N.W. 362 (1894) (state law
requiring payment of extra compensation for work exceeding eight hours is unconstitutional violation
of freedom of contract); Godcharles & Co. v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 6 A. 354 (1886) (state law
requiring employers to pay workmen in money rather than in goods is unconstitutional violation of
freedom of contract).
5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
6. Ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1976 & Supp. III
1979)). The original National Labor Relations Act, the Wagner Act, was amended by the Labor-
Management Relations Act (known as the Taft-Hartley Amendments), in 1947. Ch. 120, tit. 1, §
101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). The NLRA was further amended in 1959, by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act (known as the Landrum-Griffin Amendments). Pub. L. No. 86-257, §§
701(b), 703, 73 Stat. 542 (1959). In this article, the "Wagner Act" refers to the original 1935 Act and
the "National Labor Relations Act" or "NLRA" refers to the Act after the 1947 amendments. The
word "Act" refers to either depending on the context.
7. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
8. See id. at 399-400.
9. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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health and safety conditions,"0 discrimination by race, sex," and age,'2 and
some of the terms of private pensions." These statutes have generally been
regarded as regulating peripheral conditions of the wage bargain.
The core conditions of the bargain, on the other hand, have been deter-
mined by collective bargaining. The Wagner Act established collective
bargaining as the means by which workers themselves could determine the
core conditions of the sale of their labor. The Act contained a package of
rights for employees and imposed corresponding duties on employers to
facilitate collective employee action, in order to create "equality of bar-
gaining power between employers and employees."" The Act gave em-
ployees the right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to engage in con-
certed activities for mutual aid and protection." It also gave employees the
right to be free of employer interference with those rights by making it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate unions, to discriminate
against employees because of union membership, to refuse to bargain with
a certified union, or otherwise to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed [by the Act]."" The Act
established an administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), which was empowered to certify majority bargaining represent-
atives' 7 and to prevent unfair labor practices. The Board was authorized
to conduct investigations into unfair labor practice charges, to hold adjudi-
catory hearings, to issue cease-and-desist orders, to award affirmative rem-
edies, and, in appropriate cases, to petition the federal courts for injunc-
tive relief to effect the goals of the Act.'"
Despite the broad nature of the intervention detailed in it, the Act has
been interpreted by industrial pluralists to confer no substantive rights
upon labor at all. A procedural interpretation has emerged that treats the
Act as a "bare legal framework" to facilitate private ordering by manage-
ment and labor." This interpretation has negated many of the substantive
rights that the Act explicitly conferred. In fact, it has prevented interven-
tion by government in employment relations more effectively than did the
Lochner decision. Furthermore, this interpretive tradition is premised
10. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. 1111979).
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
12. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
13. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
16. Id. § 158(a).
17. Id. § 159.
18. Id. § 160.
19. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1000
(1955).
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upon an assumption of equality of power between management and labor,
the very equality that the Act was intended to create. This assumption has
rendered the Act incapable of actually creating that equality.
B. The Theory of Industrial Plurahsm
Archibald Cox, one of the leading theorists of industrial pluralism, de-
scribes the collective bargaining process as follows:
In annual conferences, the employer and the union representing the
employees, in addition to fixing wage rates, write a basic statute for
the government of an industry or plant, under which they work out
together through grievance procedures and arbitration the day-to-day
problems of administration. By this "collective bargaining" the em-
ployee shares through his chosen representatives in fixing the condi-
tions under which he works, and a rule of the law is substituted for
absolute authority. With these roots in the ideals of self-rule and
government according to law, the institution seems certain to grow,
at least as long as there survives the political democracy on whose
achievement it has followed.2
This is the basic industrial pluralist model for class relations; 21 it is deeply
embedded in post-war American labor law doctrine and literature. Al-
though it appears simple and straightforward, it represents a sophisti-
cated, integrated, and comprehensive vision of class relations.
William Leiserson was the first to apply the metaphor of industrial
self-government to American labor relations. Referring to the English
system of constitutional government, he described the joint meetings be-
tween the union and management as parliamentary, being "at the same
time constitutional conventions and statute making legislatures. 23 To
complete the analogy, Leiserson also stated that private arbitration of dis-
putes under the collective agreement played the role of the judiciary and
was necessary to the metaphoric constitutional government.24
20. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (pt. 1), 61 HARV. L. REV.
1, 1 (1947).
21. See W. LEISERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY 6-7 (1959); C. GOLDEN & H.
ROTTENBERG, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 40-43 (1942); Cox, Some Aspects of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (pt. 2), 61 HARV. L. REV. 274, 274-77 (1948).
22. Leiserson, Constitutional Government in American Industries, 12 AM. ECON. REV. 56, 60-61
(Supp. 1922). Leiserson was the Chairman of the Board of Arbitration of the Men's Clothing Indus-
try in New York during the 1920s.
23. Id. at 62. This meant that the problem of judicial review-that is, the power of arbitrators to
override the collective agreement-did not arise.
24. Id. at 63. Leiserson was speaking in a time when arbitration was uncommon to labor agree-
ments. To show how well it worked, he applied the self-government metaphor to particular disputes
resolved by the New York and Chicago garment industry arbitration boards. Thus, for example, he
said that because a constitution must give all citizens equal protection, in the garment industry when
1514
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Arbitration is not a mere afterthought in this scheme, but goes to the
heart of this vision of the collective bargaining process. Under the Wagner
Act, once a union is formed, both the union and management have a stat-
utory duty to bargain together to produce a written agreement.21 Under
any such agreement, issues of contract application and enforcement inevi-
tably arise. If there is no mechanism for enforcing the collective agree-
ment, then the duty to bargain is a sham, and the union has in fact
achieved no power in the shop at all.
Therefore, the question of enforcing collective bargaining agreements is
the same question as what power a union actually has under the statutory
scheme set up by the Wagner Act. In the industrial pluralist model, dis-
putes over breaches of collective agreements are not submitted to an ad-
ministrative or judicial tribunal. Rather, they are submitted to the dis-
pute-resolution mechanism that the parties in this mini-democracy have
established for themselves-private arbitration. The arbitrator takes on
the functions of a judge, outside of the legislative process of contract nego-
tiations and above the day-to-day disputes between the parties. The power
of the union, then, is to compel its employer to go to arbitration.26 This,
however, is a procedural power only. The actual power is determined in
every given dispute by the particular arbitrator.
According to the industrial pluralist view, there is a separation of pow-
ers in the workplace: the parties are said to govern themselves democrati-
cally. A corollary of this description of the industrial world is the pre-
scription that the processes of the state-the courts and administrative
tribunals-should keep out. The workplace, portrayed as a self-contained
mini-democracy, becomes in the industrial pluralist theory an island of
self-rule whose self-regulating mechanisms must not be disrupted by judi-
cial intervention or other scrutiny by outsiders.27
C. This Article
This article argues that the industrial pluralist model of collective bar-
gaining represents an ideology shared by legal theorists, judges, industrial
sociologists, and labor economists in the post-war era.28 Those who shared
work is slack, arbitrators have ordered the companies not to layoff people, but to spread and share the
work equally. Id. at 70. He gave other instances in which arbitrators, using the self-government
metaphor, prevented subcontracting, id. at 73, approved featherbedding for workers displaced by tech-
nological change, id. at 74, and even discharged supervisors pursuant to a worker's complaint of
abusive treatment, id. Arbitral decisions such as these are almost unheard of today, but Leiserson's
basic vision of the workplace as a mini-democracy with the arbitrator as the judge has survived.
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1976).
26. Shulman, supra note 19, at 1007.
27. Id. at 1024.
28. Ideology is an elusive concept whose meaning has been defined differently by various writers.
For the purposes of this article, I define ideology as the set of categories with which one views the
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the ideology29 were the post-war liberals who argued for a form of collec-
tive bargaining that would preserve the rights of labor unions. Their writ-
ings had an enormous impact on the shape of legal doctrine and on the
terms of labor-management debates. Although some may disavow either
the descriptive or prescriptive implications of the ideology, they all ex-
pressed in their writings a belief in the basic tenets of the industrial plu-
ralist ideology. These tenets can be summarized as follows:
(1) the workplace under collective bargaining can be analogized to a
political democracy;
(2) private arbitration is a necessary element in the workplace mini-
democracy;
(3) in order to foster arbitration and to ensure the functioning of the
mini-democracy, the processes of the state must not intervene;
(4) individual rights in collective bargaining must yield to the collec-
tive rights of the union; and
(5) under the Act, labor's only rights are to bargain collectively and
to arbitrate its disputes with its employer.
This article takes a close look at this ideology in order to evaluate its
plausibility as a description of the industrial world and its desirability as a
prescription for the organization of class relations in society as a whole.
The next two sections trace Supreme Court doctrine that has inter-
preted the Act, in order to demonstrate the extent to which it has been
informed by the industrial pluralist ideology. The remainder of the article
is devoted to a critique of the ideology itself. The argument is that the
ideology, although it has a certain surface plausibility, is fundamentally
incoherent. It falls to provide an internally consistent basis for judicial
decision, and it cannot account for the practice of arbitrators. The roots of
this incoherency are traced to the fundamental flaw in the description of
the industrial world that the ideology contains and to its prescription of
government nonintervention in industrial life. It is also argued that the
ideology, although incoherent and basicially unworkable, has had a tenac-
ity and longevity in legal theory due to its fulfillment of certain unstated
world. Individuals and societies formulate categories in order to navigate in the world. Individuals
need categories in order to organize experience and to act. E. SCHACTEL, METAMORPHOSIS 284
(1959). These categories are abstractions of experience and observation; they embody both a descrip-
tion of the world and a prescription for action. It is the formal coherence of such categories that I call
"ideology."
29. Among them are Archibald Cox of the Harvard Law School, Harry Shulman, former Dean
of the Yale Law School and Impartial Umpire for the UAW-Ford Motor Company agreement, John
Dunlop, former Secretary of Labor, George Taylor, former chairman of the War Labor Board and
founding President of the American Arbitration Association, Arthur Goldberg, former labor lawyer
and Supreme Court Justice, Neil Chamberlain, economist at the Harvard Business School, Benjamin
Aaron, a prominent arbitrator, and Sumner Schlicter, a leading labor economist.
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functions-it serves as a vehicle for the manipulation of employee discon-
tent and for the legitimation of existing inequalities of power in the
workplace.
D. A Final Preliminary Observation
This article is a general critique of the interpretive history of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. The Act, like most of the social legislation of
the past forty-five years, is now coming under attack. Government regula-
tion in many spheres of economic life is being curtailed, and the liberal
programs of the past are being dismantled. In this context, there is also
likely to be a reexamination of the rights of labor conferred by the Act.
This article, in criticizing the prevailing interpretations of the Act, does
not propose that the Act be jettisoned for its failures. On the contrary, it
urges a substantive interpretation of labor relations.
The article's larger argument is that the industrial pluralist interpreta-
tion of the Act provided only a half-way measure. Under the guise of
government regulation and protection, that interpretation delegated the
crucial aspects of collective bargaining to a private forum, shielded from
public penetration. Such half-way measures are characteristic of many
liberal social programs of the last generation." Medicaid and Medicare,
for example, have attempted to provide health care to poor people without
affecting the market-based pricing mechanism for health services. 3 ' Such
programs brought certain aspects of economic life within the realm of gov-
ernment regulation, but the regulation itself involved the delegation of the
crucial issues back to the private sector. This article is a case study of the
failure of such half-way measures. ]It is this failure that has rendered the
social programs of the past vulnerable to the assault now in progress. As
these programs are curtailed or dismantled, it is important for progressive
thinkers and activists to analyze the reasons for the failure. From this
analysis, a theoretical framework can emerge to inform the development of
more viable programs for government action in the future.
30. Grant McConnell reports that the parcelling out of government power to essentially private
groups has become increasingly characteristic of government programs in America. The agencies of
government themselves, he argues, become moribund as a result of this delegation:
The public official, for his part, will by this process have successfully maintained his formal
position and have cleared his desk of immediate work and trouble. Nevertheless, by his action
he will have materially diminished his office and will over time discover that he has incurred a
permanent debt to the group he has helped conjure into being and has endowed with authority.
G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 163 (1966). McConnell's analysis
implies that if government agencies retained their jurisdiction and did not delegate their power to
private groups, they would be altogether different institutions.
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396j (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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II. The Doctrine of Industrial Pluralism
Over the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has developed an inter-
pretation of the NLRA that expresses the industrial pluralist vision of
relations between management and labor. This doctrinal development can
be seen most dearly when set against the backdrop of judicial treatment of
collective bargaining agreements prior to the passage of the Act.
A. Judicial Treatment of Collective Bargaining Agreements Prior to
The NLRA
In the nineteenth century, courts were generally hostile to collective ac-
tion by workers. They employed doctrines such as conspiracy and tortious
interference with contractual relations to suppress the organization of la-
bor." By the early twentieth century, however, courts began to accept col-
lective organization of employees as a useful, even necessary, counter-
weight to employers' control of the labor market.3
As unions became more prevalent and gained acceptability, they called
upon courts to enforce the rights contained in their collective bargaining
agreements. Initially, the courts did not permit unions to bring suit to
enforce these agreements because unions were unincorporated associa-
tions. 4 In addition, the agreements were said to lack mutuality of obliga-
tion because a union's implicit promise to provide laborers in exchange for
employer concessions was unenforceable due to the personal service rule."
This view of collective bargaining agreements barred unions from seeking
legal remedies for even the most flagrant violations of agreements, because
unions had no standing to sue.
At best, courts in the early twentieth century permitted individual
workers to sue to enforce rights embodied in the collective agreements.
32. Sayre, Labor and the Courts, 39 YALE L.J. 682, 684-95 (1930) (conspiracy); Note, Tortious
Interference With Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1529-
30 (1980) (tortious interference with contract). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE
LABOR INJUNCTION 4 (1930) (conspiracy and restraint of trade used as "convenient grab-bag terms"
to render group activities illegal); Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-9
(1894) (tort of interference with business relations as applied to labor union activities is judicial
policymaking).
33. See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 108-09, 44 N. E. 1077, 1081-82 (1896)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N.Y. 207, 211-12, 76 N.E. 5, 7 (1905).
34. See, e.g., A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 169 F. 225, 228 (6th Cir. 1909); Grand Int'l Bhd. of
Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 206 Ala. 196, 198, 89 So. 435, 436 (1921); see Sturges, Unincorpo-
rated Associations as Parties to Actions, 33 YALE L.J. 383, 396-99 (1924) (legal doctrine that prevents
labor unions and other unincorporated associations from suing as legal entities is policy judgment
which courts should abandon).
35. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Driscoll, 217 Mich. 384, 388-89, 186 N.W. 522, 523 (1922); Stone
Cleaning & Pointing Union v. Russell, 38 Misc. 513, 513, 77 N.Y.S. 1049, 1050 (Sup. Ct. 1902); see
Comment, Present Day Labor Litigation, 30 YALE L.J. 618, 622 (1921) (personal service rule bars
courts from enjoining strikes by ordering individuals back to work).
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The terms of the agreements were treated as prevailing customs or us-
ages-analogous to an understanding as to who would supply tools or
workclothes-that were implied into the individual contracts of employ-
ment. Even when a breach deprived individual workers of a specific enti-
tlement, they could prevail in a suit only if they could prove that they
personally had known of the "usage" and had adopted it as part of their
original contract of hire. The courts often set a high standard of proof,
and as a result, workers rarely could recover.
A typical case is Hudson v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry.3' An em-
ployee was fired for misconduct and tried to use the grievance procedure
specified in his collective bargaining agreement. When his supervisor re-
fused to give him a hearing, he sued on the contract for wages due. The
court gave several reasons for rejecting the claim. The employee's name
was not explicitly included in the collective agreement, and there was no
evidence that the union had acted as his agent in concluding it; nor was
there evidence that the plaintiff had ratified the agreement when he ac-
cepted the job. Mere knowledge that the agreement was in force did not
constitute ratification. The court refused to infer ratification of the collec-
tive agreement from the fact of the employee's membership in the union.
3 7
Thus, the collective agreement was reduced to a "memorandum of rates of
pay and regulations . . . which acquires legal force because people make
contracts in reference to it."' The court stated that the union's role was
merely "to induce employers to establish usages in respect to wages and
working conditions which are fair, reasonable, and humane, leaving to its
members each to determine for himself whether or not and for what
length of time he will contract in reference to such usages."39 The treat-
ment of the collective bargaining agreement in this case was typical of the
custom or usage doctrine that prevailed until about 1920.40 Using this ap-
proach, the courts denied that collective agreements were contracts at all,
so that only the individual contract of employment was enforceable. 1
In 1922, however, unions gained a major victory. In Schlesinger v.
Quinto,4 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court upheld
an injunction to prevent the garment manufacturers' association from re-
storing a piece-rates system, increasing hours, and reducing wage rates, all
36. 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47 (1913).
37. Id. at 715, 154 S.W. at 49.
38. Id. at 717, 154 S.W. at 49-50.
39. Id. at 715, 154 S.W. at 49.
40. See, e.g., W.A. Snow Iron Works, Inc. v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382, 116 N.E. 801 (1917);
Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S.W. 136 (1904).
41. See Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 HARV. L. REV. 572, 581-93
(1931); Note, The Present Status of Collective Labor Agreements, 51 HARV. L. REV. 520 (1938).
42. 201 A.D. 487, 194 N.Y.S. 401 (1922).
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in violation of the collective bargaining agreement in effect. Both the
lower and appellate courts assumed that the union had standing to sue on
the collective agreement, and focused on whether an injunction was the
appropriate remedy. The Appellate Division viewed the agreement as a
contract between two organizations both of which could compel perform-
ance by their members, and thus found mutuality of obligation. 3 It went
on to hold that just as employers were able to obtain injunctive relief from
the courts in labor disputes, mutuality of remedy required that the same
relief be available to unions.4 4 "[T]he law does not have one rule for the
employer and another for the employee. 45
Several years later, a New York court made it clear that a union had
standing to sue by noting that the union has more at stake when an em-
ployer breaches a collective agreement than the sum of damages sustained
by its members. In Goldman v. Cohen," an employer was temporarily
enjoined from locking out its union employees and moving its plant to
another location where it intended to operate on a nonunion basis. The
court held that this violated the closed shop clause in the collective bar-
gaining agreement .4 The court added that the union's right of action was
essential to preserve the rights of collective bargaining and the economic
benefits to the community that collective bargaining confers.' 8
These two cases were cited as precedents in many jurisdictions through-
out the 1920s and 1930s. 9 In subsequent lawsuits, courts defined the
standards established in the labor contracts and became "the ultimate
guardians of the pact."5 " For example, in Wetzel v. Clise,5 the Supreme
Court of Washington enjoined a laundry establishment from using a
union label on its sales slips and laundry tickets after its contract with the
union expired. In Weber v. Nasser,2 a California court granted a musi-
cian's union an injunction that prevented the theaters with which the
43. Id. at 499, 194 N.Y.S. at 410.
44. Id. at 498-99, 194 N.Y.S. at 409-10.
45. Id. at 498, 194 N.Y.S. at 409.
46. 222 A.D. 631, 227 N.Y.S. 311 (1928).
47. Id. at 633, 227 N.Y.S. at 314.
48. Id. at 633, 227 N.Y.S. at 314.
49. See, e.g., Mississippi Theatres Corp. v. Hattiesburg Local 615, 174 Miss. 439, 446, 164 So.
887, 889 (1936); Harper v. Local 520, 48 S.W.2d 1033, 1040 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); see Lenhoff,
The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal System, 39 MiCd. L. REV. 1109,
1109-10 (1941) (in 20 years since Schlesinger v. Quinto, judicial barriers to enforcement of collective
agreements have disappeared); Witte, Labor's Resort to Injunctions, 39 YALE L.J. 374, 375 (1930)
(after Schlesinger v. Quinto, use of injunctions to enjoin many types of employer breaches increased).
See also Christenson, Legally Enforceable Interests in American Labor Union Working Agreements,
9 IND. L.J. 69, 102-03 (1933) (courts are beginning to permit unions to enforce collective agreements
in recognition of fact that unions have rights apart from those of their members).
50. Rice, supra note 41, at 574.
51. 148 Wash. 75, 79-80, 268 P. 161, 163 (1928).
52. 286 P. 1074 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930).
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union had contracts from discharging their orchestras and installing "talk-
ing devices." 53
The state courts continued to enforce collective bargaining agreements
as contracts even after passage of the Wagner Act in 1935." Using this
approach, the courts intervened in many aspects of the employment rela-
tionship-wages, hours, method of wage payment, selection of employees,
and union security and labor solidarity arrangements. Judicial involve-
ment spanned the scope of the relationship between labor and capital,
from the details of wage incentive structures to the larger questions of
movements of capital, investment decisions, and changes in ownership."
This indeed was a great change in the relationship between the courts and
private employment. 6
B. Collective Bargaining Agreements Under the Wagner Act
The impact of the Wagner Act on these developments remained uncer-
tain through the Second World War.17 Because the Act did not give fed-
eral courts or the NLRB jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining
53. Id. at 1075, 1077.
54. See, e.g., Mississippi Theatres Corp. v. Hattiesburg Local 615, 174 Miss. 439, 164 So. 887
(1936); Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 292 N.Y.S. 898 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Farulla v.
Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 155 Misc. 262, 279 N.Y.S. 228 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
55. See, e.g., Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 183, 292 N.Y.S. 898, 905 (Sup.
Ct. 1936) (directing runaway shop to end lockout and put union members back to work, and to move
machinery and other firm assets back to original locations); Farulla v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc, 155
Misc. 262, 286, 279 N.Y.S. 228, 254 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (company that had relocated to evade union
directed to return and to comply with terms of collective bargaining agreement regarding certain
working conditions). The court in the latter case justified this drastic remedy by saying, "[t]he logic of
the situation calls for application of strong measures. . .. Without a remedy as wide as that need,
unscrupulous employers of labor will be tempted to play one community off against another ..
Id.
56. Although contractualism in law is usually seen as the epitome of individualistic private order-
ing without judicial interference, see Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1767-71 (1976), the doctrines of contractualism, in a collective setting, have the
opposite effect. Collective contractualism enables courts to become involved in many details of the
relationship between the parties. See generally Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Con-
tracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525 (1969). The reason for this is that collective contracts are not merely the sum
of the individual contracts of union members. When there are many parties to and many terms in an
agreement, the meaning of performance is different than when only two parties are involved. Rather
than creating sharply defined contract rights, collective contracts establish a network of interwoven
rights standing in complex relationship to each other. In addition, in the employment setting, the
conditions of performance of a contract are fluid because of the long-term nature of the relationship
involved and the unpredictability of technology and production requirements. Moreover, certain ques-
tions that are relatively easy to address in the context of an individual contract require extensive
judicial intervention in a collective context. This is true of such questions as: What is a breach rather
than a modification? What is a repudiation rather than a protest against the other's breach? When
has each side acted in good faith to keep its obligation? In answering these questions and in enforcing
collective employment contracts, courts become intricately involved in the day-to-day relationship be-
tween management and labor.
57. See C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 379 (1946); Lenhoff, supra note 49, at 1136 (legal
status of contracts to be negotiated by statutory representative "awaits solution"); Note, supra note 41,
at 531-33 (evaluating impact of Wagner Act on validity of labor contracts).
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agreements, no dispute that concerned enforcement of such an agreement
came before the United States Supreme Court between 1933 and 1944.
Dicta in several cases suggested, however, that the Court did not differen-
tiate collective bargaining agreements from conventional contracts. 8 In-
deed, the Court applied contract law notions such as anticipatory repudia-
tion 9 and the duty to mitigate damages 0 to collective bargaining
agreements. In addition, the Court implied that employment contract
rights and obligations would be enforceable in state courts.61
Although the judiciary lacked a coherent vision of labor relations under
the Wagner Act, glimmerings of industrial pluralism appeared at the end
of this period of uncertainty. In JI. Case Co. v. NLRB,62 the Supreme
Court held that individual employment contracts, although lawful in
themselves, could not excuse an employer's refusal to bargain with a
union,63 and that the individual contracts could not limit the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement." In commenting on the general nature of
collective bargaining agreements, the Court noted that such agreements
are not contracts in the conventional sense; rather, they are like tariffs or
rate schedules, which "do not of themselves establish any relationships but
which do govern the terms of the shipper or insurer or customer relation-
ship whenever and with whomever it may be established."6 This was a
major step in the direction of industrial pluralism. It was not a wholesale
adoption of the industrial pluralist perspective, however, because the anal-
ogy of collective bargaining agreements to tariffs or rate schedules does not
carry with it the same prescription of judicial nonintervention as does the
self-sufficient mini-democracy analogy of industrial pluralism. Rather, the
schedule-of-rates analogy permits the enforcement of the terms of collec-
tive bargaining agreements in the courts.
The implications of this view of collective bargaining agreements re-
mained unexplored because shortly after J.I. Case was decided, the Court
wholeheartedly adopted the industrial pluralist paradigm in its stead. J.I.
Case did establish, however, one of the essential features of industrial plu-
58. See, e.g., H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 526 (1941) (labor agreements analogized
to normal business agreements); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co. 306 U.S. 292, 297
(1939) (applying doctrine of offer and acceptance to duty to bargain). See generally Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62
MINN. L. REV. 265, 293-310 (1978) (discussing judicial adoption of contractualist language in inter-
pretation of Wagner Act between 1937 and 1941).
59. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939).
60. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941).
61. See National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 365-66 (1940) (Wagner Act does not
foreclose employees from acting to secure adjudication on contracts in state courts).
62. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
63. Id. at 337.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 335.
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ralism. By holding that individual employment contracts could not defeat
a collective bargaining agreement, the Court established that the rights
conferred by the Act are collective rights, not individual rights. This com-
ported with the notion, found in general pluralist theories of democracy,
that the basic unit of social life is the group."
C. The Rising Prominence and Respectability of Arbitration
As these legal doctrines developed, voluntary arbitration became the
preferred method of labor dispute settlement under the War Labor Board
(WLB).67 In 1941, management and labor voluntarily agreed to suspend
all strikes and lockouts. The following year, the Economic Stabilization
Act required government approval of all collective agreements. 8 The
WLB declined to dictate the terms of those agreements, and instead al-
lowed labor and management to arrange them voluntarily. In addition,
pursuant to Executive Order 9017,69 the Board required all grievances that
arose under collective bargaining agreements to go to arbitration. 0 The
WLB not only encouraged parties to include arbitration clauses in their
collective agreements, but also ordered arbitration of some disputes that
arose under agreements that had no such clause.7' Moreover, it enforced
arbitrator's awards without reviewing their substance in order to support
arbitration as an effective instrument for the peaceful settlement of
disputes.7"
At the end of the war, the no-strike era came to an end, and in 1947,
the country experienced the largest strike wave in its history. Labor used
its new found legal and organizational strength to demand increases in
wages that had fallen behind the wartime inflation rate and to oppose
cutbacks in employment as the defense economy was dismantled. Industry
groups responded to the strike wave by urging government controls on the
terms of industrial life. Such government intervention was labeled "com-
pulsory arbitration" by its critics, and contrasted to the more voluntary
processes developed under the WLB.73
66. R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 145 (1956); S. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN 39-
40 145 (1963).
67. See Freiden & Ulman, Arbitration and the National War Labor Board, 58 HARV. L. REV.
309, 344 (1945); Frey, Arbitration and the War Labor Board, 29 IOWA L. REV. 202, 210 (1944). But
see Updegraff, War-time Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 29 IOWA L. REV. 328, 345-46 (1944) (com-
paring United States Conciliation Service with WLB to conclude that WLB was less "voluntary").
68. Act of Oct. 2, 1942, ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765 (expired 1944); see Boudin, The Authority of the
National War Labor Board Over Labor Disputes, 43 MICH. L. REV. 329, 329-32 (1949) (discussing
statutory and constitutional authority of WLB).
69. 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (1942).
70. Freiden & Ulman, supra note 67, at 313, 315.
71. Id. at 344.
72. Id. at 324.
73. For example, one legal scholar wrote in 1949: "The phrase 'compulsory arbitration' has com-
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The spectre of government regulation of daily plant relations prompted
a vigorous defense of collective bargaining. Prounion labor commentators
and economists envisioned compulsory arbitration as the initial step to-
ward government control of prices, profits, and production. Compulsory
arbitration, they argued, threatened to destroy collective bargaining and
labor unions, and ultimately threatened to undermine the free enterprise
system. 4
This movement to defend collective bargaining spawned the ideology of
industrial pluralism. Professional labor relations specialists sought to jus-
tify collective bargaining while dissociating themselves from the class con-
flict it seemed to entail. Thus, they developed an ideology that tied collec-
tive bargaining to the entire system of private determination of wages and
working conditions. Voluntarism in labor relations was equated with the
free enterprise system."5 Within this ideology, voluntary arbitration occu-
pied a crucial position. The industrial pluralists needed to demonstrate
that industrial disputes could be resolved peacefully, thereby avoiding la-
bor-management strife. Any such mechanism, if it was to fit within the
ideology, had to produce a solution to which both parties could be said to
have consented. Judicial resolution of labor disputes, for example, was
unacceptable because it imposed a noncontractual solution upon the par-
ties.7 6 Voluntary arbitration, by contrast, presented the attractive possibil-
ity of producing a solution that both labor and management had previ-
ously agreed would bind them.
In addition to providing a dispute-resolution mechanism apparently
consistent with the premises of industrial pluralism, voluntary arbitration
had pragmatic attractions. The wartime experience with arbitration had
resulted in widespread use of arbitration provisions in collective bargain-
ing agreements. Arbitration therefore had become a credible dispute-reso-
lution mechanism. At the same time, arbitrators emerged as a distinct pro-
fessional group who successfully advocated their role in the collective
monly come to mean any system whereby the parties to a labor dispute are forced by the government
to submit their dispute to final settlement by some third party. The usual modes of self-help, the
strike and the lock-out, are forbidden." Williams, The Compulsory Settlement of Contract Negotia-
tion Labor Disputes, 27 TEX. L. REV. 587, 588 (1949); see Freiden & Ulman, supra note 67, at 345
(direct government intervention is "administratively impossible and out of harmony with the ex-
pressed desire of labor and industry"); Jaffe, Post-War Labor Relations: The Contributions of the
War Labor Board, 29 IOWA L. REV. 276, 281-83 (1944) (expressing doubt that compulsory arbitra-
tion would be widely used after war); Updegraff, supra note 67, at 331-35, 342-46 (discussing advan-
tages of voluntary arbitration).
74. See Freiden, The Public Interest in Labor Dispute Settlement, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
367, 372-73 (1947) (collective bargaining weakened by any government role as decisionmaker).
75. C. GOLDEN & H. RUTTENBERG, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 40-43 (1942);
Shulman, supra note 19, at 1002.
76. Sanders, Types of Labor Disputes and Approaches to their Settlement, 12 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 211, 217 (1947).
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bargaining process.77
The industrial pluralist metaphor of modern industry as a mini-democ-
racy also gave collective bargaining a legitimacy derived from the legiti-
macy of the larger political system. In democratic theory, the electorate is
thought to guide national policy through its choice of representatives. By
analogy, industrial pluralism posits that workers in factories are free and
equal actors who decide the conditions of their work through their elected
union representatives. This analogy provided a means of viewing indus-
trial conditions as a product of worker self-determination, rather than of
management fiat.
D. Section 301: A Legal Obstacle
In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the Wagner
Act.7" Section 301 of the amended Act threatened to undermine the evolv-
ing industrial pluralist model of collective bargaining by apparently creat-
ing federal court jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements."
Legal commentators, such as Shulman and Cox, feared that section 301, if
so interpreted, could end arbitration and, as a result, could end voluntary
collective bargaining. Such a change in the law, they argued, would shat-
ter the pluralists' image of the workplace as a private democracy. The
federal judiciary would displace arbitration, the mutually agreed-upon
dispute resolution device, and open the way for government determination
of the terms of industrial life.80
Harry Shulman adamantly criticized judicial intervention to enforce
collective bargaining agreements. He urged that the administration and
interpretation of trade agreements be left to the "judicial" mechanism the
77. R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 19 (1965).
78. Ch. 120, tit. 1, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-
187 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976) states: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties . .. ."
80. See, e.g., Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1957). Bickel and Wellington articulated a number of argu-
ments about why arbitration was a better vehicle than the courts for resolution of day-to-day labor
disputes:
[T]he point is that the courts will draw from a body of experience not germane to the problem
they will face. Given their limited means of informing themselves and the episodic nature of
their efforts to do so, they will only dimly perceive the situations on which they impose their
order. Even if they do perceive, they will necessarily come too late with a pound of "remedy"
where the smaller measure of prevention was needed. Their rules, tailored to the last bit of
trouble, will never catch up with the next and different dispute. They will allow or forbid and
be wrong in either event, because continuous, pragmatic and flexible regulation alone can help.
Id. at 25. The arguments for arbitration based on the special expertise of arbitrators, the informality
of arbitration procedure, and the speed and flexibility of arbitral remedies have not always been
supported by experience. Feller, Arbitration: The Days of Its Glory Are Numbered, 2 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 97, 98-99 (1977).
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parties had established-the grievance and arbitration procedure."' Resort
to the courts was only appropriate when self-government in the workplace
disintegrated completely. Sporadic judicial intervention in labor disputes
would corrode the parties' continuing relationship and adversely affect the
evolving systems of self-government . 2 Archibald Cox, although not as
critical of section 301 as was Shulman, also advocated the primacy of ar-
bitration. Cox urged that the courts respect the "new institutions of self-
government" and coexist with arbitration in a relationship of mutual
support. 3
Cox and Shulman shared the interpretation that the NLRA created an
institutional framework for self-government but did not confer any sub-
stantive rights on labor. In their view, the right to organize and the duty
to bargain-the major substantive provisions of the Act-established a
"bare legal framework [which] is hardly an encroachment on the premise
that wages and other conditions of employment be left to autonomous de-
termination by employers and labor. On the contrary, [the Act] merely
establishes the conditions necessary for the exercise of that autonomy." 4
Hence, they urged the courts not to use section 301 to preempt private
arbitration or to expand government control of the workplace. Instead,
they called on courts to affirm the industrial pluralist vision of the demo-
cratic, self-determined workplace. The Supreme Court, over the next
twenty-five years, did just that.
E. The Impatt of Section 301 on the Enforceability of Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements
Section 301 first reached the Supreme Court for interpretation in Asso-
ciation of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric
81. H. SHULMAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ARBITRATION 19, 20-21 (Institute of Industrial
Relations, University of California, 1949).
82. Shulman, supra note 19, at 1024.
83. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601, 604-5 (1956); see Cox, Re-
flections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1488-89 (1959) (analyzing judicial per-
spective on role of arbitrator) [hereinafter cited as Cox, Reflections].
84. Shulman, supra note 19, at 1000. The pluralists argue that the right to organize does not
guarantee union security and that the duty to bargain does not entail a judgment about the fairness of
the terms of the agreement being negotiated. In this view, no substantive judgments are implied by the
Act. For example, Cox and Dunlop described the extent of the duty to bargain as follows:
Once it is understood that the function of Section 8(a)(5) [the duty to bargain] was to estab-
lish an institution, it becomes fairly clear that an employer does not commit an unfair labor
practice by refusing to discuss, outside the framework of a grievance procedure, matters to
which the procedure applies.
Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63
HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1104 (1950). But see Jensen, Good Faith Bargaining With No Concessions
Under the NLRA-An Intractable Antinomy, 49 N.D. L. REV. 85, 97 (1972) (it is impossible to
enforce duty to bargain procedurally without making substantive judgments about fairness of
outcomes).
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Corp.8" The union sued Westinghouse for withholding one day's pay from
each of 4,000 union members in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement. Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion began with a discus-
sion of the constitutional problems posed by section 301 .86 He was con-
cerned that the amendment expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts
in nondiversity cases beyond the scope of Article III.7 Although he con-
sidered the possibility that section 301 was not merely procedural, but was
meant to apply federal substantive law to suits over breaches of collective
bargaining agreements,88 he concluded that neither the legislative history
nor the statute itself could support such an interpretation." He also re-
jected the possibility that section 301 was intended to empower the federal
courts to resolve the conceptual and legal ambiguity of the nature of col-
lective bargaining agreements.9 0 Frankfurter concluded that it was unde-
sirable to give section 301 a substantive interpretation because it would
make the federal courts "inextricably involved in questions of interpreta-
tion of the language of contracts.""1 Frankfurter, however, did not declare
the statute unconstitutional. Reasoning that it was unnecessary to decide
whether the union could sue under section 301, he found that the case
involved 4,000 individuals, each of whom had a valid suit in a state court
for breach of contract.92 He thereby avoided the constitutional issue by
deciding that, whatever the constitutionality of the statute, it was not in-
tended to permit a union to sue to enforce rights of individuals that could
be enforced elsewhere.93 Thus the suit was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Only two other Justices, Burton and Minton, joined in this opinion. An
equal number challenged Frankfurter on the larger point involved-the
constitutionality of section 301. Reed in a concurrence and Douglas and
Black in a dissent all claimed that section 301 created federal substantive
law in the form of "guiding principles which will bear on contracts made
under it" and "machinery for reaching those agreements."94
Only two years later, in the landmark decision of Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills,95 a new majority of five vindicated the dissenters
of Westinghouse Electric Corp. by upholding the constitutionality of
85. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
86. Id. at 442.
87. Id. at 449-51.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 447, 449.
90. Id. at 455-56.
91. Id. at 456.
92. Id. at 460-61.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 462 (Reed, J., concurring); id. at 465 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting).
95. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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section 301. Justice Douglas' majority opinion stated that section 301 was
a mandate to the federal courts to create a federal substantive law of col-
lective bargaining agreements to implement "the policy of our national
labor laws."9  Lincoln Mills held that a federal court could grant a
union specific enforcement of an employer's promise to arbitrate griev-
ances over work loads and work assignments. In establishing the constitu-
tionality of section 301, Douglas concluded that its history indicated a con-
gressional intent to promote ho-strike clauses in collective bargaining
agreements." From this he reasoned that
[p]lainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid
pro quo for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the
legislation does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts
over labor organizations. It expresses a federal policy that federal
courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor
organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in
that way."
The "quid pro quo," asserted without any authority in the legislative his-
tory and without any empirical basis, became the substantive meaning
that saved the constitutionality of section 301. As Douglas subsequently
developed it, the concept of quid pro quo converted arbitration itself into
the national labor policy which federal courts were to interpret the law to
create.
Arbitration was elevated to the center stage of national labor policy in
1960 in three cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy, all written by
Justice Douglas. United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.,99
the first of the three, held that courts should enforce agreements to arbi-
trate irrespective of the merit of the underlying grievance. Douglas indi-
cated that a court should decide only whether the grievance is governed by
the arbitration clause of the collective agreement and therefore comes
within the promiseto arbitrate.100
The second case, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co.,"' created a presumption of arbitrability. 10 2 In that case, the union
filed a grievance when the company subcontracted maintenance work. The
company refused to arbitrate; it relied on an ambiguous management
rights clause to argue that it did not promise to arbitrate that kind of
96. Id. at 456.
97. Id. at 453-54.
98. Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
99. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
100. Id. at 567-68.
101. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
102. Id. at 585.
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dispute. The court repeated its previous rule that the judicial inquiry is
only whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate the question involved.
When the scope of the agreement to arbitrate is ambiguous, "[d]oubts
should be resolved in favor of coverage." 1°1
The third case in the trilogy, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., °4 involved a company's refusal to comply with an arbitra-
tor's award of reinstatement and back pay for several workers who had
been fired. The company claimed that because the back pay period ex-
tended beyond the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement,
the arbitrator had exceeded his authority, which was derived only from
the collective bargaining agreement. In holding for the union, the court
stated that an arbitrator's award will be enforced so long as it "draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement."'10 Furthermore, the
court said that arbitrators need not disclose the rationale for their decision,
and that "mere ambiguity" concerning its basis will not invalidate the
award."0 6 If the award could conceivably be derived from the collective
bargaining agreement, the arbitrator has acted within his authority.
The Steelworkers Trilogy elevated arbitration to a favored position by
requiring courts to promote arbitration, without permitting them to scruti-
nize the outcomes of the disputes. Paradoxically, this extreme judicial def-
erence derived from the extreme judicial lawmaking of Lincoln Mills.'0°
F. The Institutional Implications
Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy established a federal com-
mon law of labor relations in which voluntary arbitration was made the
primary institution for the resolution of disputes between management
and labor. The doctrines enunciated in those cases defined the relationship
between the courts and arbitration: the courts were to support, but not to
interfere with, the parties' self-government.108 The Supreme Court's deci-
sion to substitute the arbitral forum for the judicial forum was not a mere
"change of venue": the choice of forum has an impact on the substantive
rights of the aggrieved parties. 09 As Justice Black pointed out dissenting
in a later case that applied the doctrine of the Steelworkers Trilogy:
103. Id. at 582-83.
104. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
105. Id. at 597.
106. Id. at 598.
107. For a critique of judicial lawmaking in the Lincoln Mills decision, see Bickel & Wellington,
supra note 80, at 34-35 (Court should have "remanded" case to Congress for consideration of broad
delegation of power under § 301).
108. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960).
109. See United States Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 359-61 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
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Arbitration differs from judicial proceedings in many ways: arbitra-
tion carries no right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment; arbitrators need not be instructed in the law; they are
not bound by rules of evidence; they need not give reasons for their
awards; witnesses need not be sworn; the record of proceedings need
not be complete; and judicial review, it has been held, is extremely
limited."10
To that list may be added certain other significant differences between the
judicial and the arbitral forums. Arbitrators are not bound by prece-
dents,"' their awards are rarely published, the hearings are not held in
open court, and arbitrators are not public officials accountable to public
pressures and sworn to uphold public policies. The arbitral hearing pro-
cess and the outcomes are wholly in the private domain.
This choice of forum was rationalized by Douglas' assertion in the
Steelworkers Trilogy that "[iln the commercial case, arbitration is the
substitute for litigation. Here [in a labor relations case] arbitration is the
substitute for industrial strife." 11 2 This alleged rationale, however, was
mere bootstrapping. If the Court had given unions and individual workers
the right to litigate breach of contract claims in federal courts under sec-
tion 301, then the stated distinction between labor arbitration and com-
mercial arbitration would disappear. Labor arbitration would be an alter-
native to litigation. Nothing in the Wagner Act or in the Taft-Hartley
Amendments dictated that workers or unions be deprived of their rights as
citizens to judicial adjudication of their disputes with employers.
In part, the institutional choice of arbitration over the courts was moti-
vated by systemic concerns-a fear that the federal courts would be inun-
dated with small claims by employees for minor company breaches of col-
lective agreements.' That concern itself, however, is not sufficient to
deprive unions or workers of their rights to use the federal courts."4 Nor
does it explain why the administrative agency established by the Act-the
NLRB-was not adequate to the task of adjudicating these disputes. The
courts justified the institutional choice by tying it to the industrial plural-
ist view that arbitration is an instrument of the parties' self-government.
110. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 664 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
111. This is not to say that some arbitrators do not follow precedent in the particular shop or
industry. See Hill, Discussion, in THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES 100, 106-07 (J. McKelvey ed.
1958).
112. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
113. See United States Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 377 (White, J., dissenting);
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 460
(1955).
114 Cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 669-70 (Black, J., dissenting) (access to
courts is important right).
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III. The Industrial Pluralist Institutional Mandate
Having established a supportive, hands-off relationship between arbi-
tration and the courts as the central pillar of national labor policy, the
Supreme Court had to determine what role, if any, the NLRB should
play in this emerging common law. Because there were three adjudicative
institutions involved in regulating labor relations-the courts, arbitration,
and the Board-the Court had to establish an orderly relationship be-
tween them. As the Court developed these interrelationships, it erected an
institutional structure for implementing national labor policy that fulfilled
the industrial pluralist vision. Much of the labor law doctrine since the
Steelworkers Trilogy can be understood as establishing this unique insti-
tutional arrangement, which, in addition to fulfilling the pluralist vision,
has had significant implications for the substantive rights sought to be
adjudicated.
A. The NLRB and Private Arbitration
In Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy, Justice Douglas side-
stepped the central question of the NLRB's role in the new labor policy.
This silence is puzzling, because the NLRB occupies a central position in
the NLRA. Moreover, both the Steelworkers Trilogy and Lincoln Mills
rely heavily on arguments about the superiority of arbitration to settle
labor disputes, citing the special expertise of arbitrators, the informality of
the arbitration procedures, and arbitrator's flexibility of remedy.11 Yet the
NLRB shares these same advantages. Furthermore, reliance upon the
Board would have quieted the systemic fears expressed that such breach of
contract suits would swamp the courts.11' The Act would support an in-
terpretation giving the NLRB jurisdiction over breaches of contract.
Under section 8(a)(1) the Board is required to prevent any interference
with employees' rights to organize and bargain collectively. Because fre-
quent employer breaches of collective agreements discredit a union and
undermine its strength, such breaches are arguably unfair labor practices.
Furthermore, under section 10(a) of the Act, the Board is empowered to
prevent unfair labor practices notwithstanding any other means of adjust-
ment established by agreement. 117 The Court, however, chose not to adopt
this viewpoint. Instead it reinforced the primacy of the arbitral forum by
diminishing the power of the Board even over its explict statutory
115. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car, 363 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-82 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1957).
116. See note 113 supra.
117. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
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jurisdiction.
The eclipsing of the NLRB by private arbitration occurred through two
simultaneous developments. Judicial review of disputes over collective bar-
gaining agreements forced the courts to consider the relationship between
the rights granted by the NLRA and the rights created by collective
agreements. Simultaneously, the Board developed its own position on dis-
putes over which the Board had concurrent jurisdiction with private arbi-
tration. These two paths intersected in the concept of deference-the no-
tion that the Board should defer to private arbitration. Deference provided
a major pillar in the emerging common law of labor relations.
The Supreme Court first faced the problem of an overlap of jurisdiction
between the Board and arbitration in Carey v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp."8 At issue was whether a group of employees should be classified as
"production and maintenance," putting them within the membership and
under the collective bargaining agreement of one union in the plant, or as
"technical employees," putting them under the agreement of the other
union in the plant. One of the unions filed a grievance claiming that some
employees were misclassified and urging that the dispute go to arbitration.
The company refused. It claimed that the dispute was a matter of repre-
sentation and unit determination, and thus one for the Board to decide.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, acknowledged that the dis-
pute could be looked at as one that involved either the construction of the
collective bargaining agreements or the application of the NLRA." 9 He
decided that national labor policy dictated that the dispute go to arbitra-
tion. Douglas reasoned that, just as a remedy from the Board does not
preclude a remedy in court for breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, an NLRB remedy should not preclude a remedy from arbitration. 2 '
Although he implied that the two unions could seek clarification of the
representation petition by the Board after an arbitration hearing was held
and decided,' he cast doubt on the possibility of dual jurisdiction. He
wrote that "[i]f by the time the dispute reaches the Board, arbitration has
already taken place, the Board shows deference to the arbitral award."'
22
The opinion equivocated on whether "deference" meant that the Board
should delay review of the dispute until after arbitration had ended or
whether it meant that the Board should decline to undertake its own deci-
sion on the merits and adopt the arbitrator's decision instead. 23 This lat-
118. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
119. Id. at 266, 268.
120. Id. at 269-70.
121. Id. at 268, 271-72.
122. Id. at 270.
123. "Defer" is a word of two subtly but significantly different meanings. It can mean "[t]o put
off to a future time; to postpone; delay," or it can mean "[t]o yield or submit to the opinion or wishes
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ter kind of deference became one of the defining features of the emerging
institutional structure of industrial pluralism.
At the same time that the policy of deference entered Supreme Court
doctrine, the NLRB developed its own position on concurrent jurisdiction
of the Board and arbitration. Spielburg Manufacturing Co. v. Harold
Gruenberg,124 decided in 1955, introduced the deference concept. In
Spielburg, the Board declined to consider a section 8(a)(3) unfair labor
practice charge after a "fair and regular" arbitration hearing had re-
viewed the same incident. ' In dispute was the discharge of four strikers
after a strike was settled. The Board deferred to the arbitrator's decision
which sustained the employer's charge of picket-line misconduct.
At first, Spielburg was relied on by the Board to dismiss unfair labor
practice charges that overlapped with completed "fair and regular" arbi-
tration proceedings. The Board, however, continued to assert jurisdiction
in cases in which arbitration had not been conducted. '26 In 1969, the
Board extended the Spielburg principle to prevent Board review of an
unfair labor practice that was scheduled for arbitration. In Joseph Schlitz
Brewing Co.,12' the Board said that even though no hearing had been
conducted, it must presume that the hearing would be fair and that the
outcome would be consistent with the Act.
The deference idea achieved its fullest expression in Collyer Insulated
Wire,"' in which the NLRB extended the principles of Spielburg and
Schlitz to defer review when no hearing was scheduled or even foresee-
able, but arbitration was possible. In Collyer, the deference principle was
interpreted to mean that the Board would withhold its processes and
would dismiss unfair labor practice complaints for all disputes subject to
an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement. M  Whether
the arbitration would actually occur, or whether it would cover the same
of another." WEBSTERS NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 687 (2d ed. 1957). In the
Carey opinion, Douglas conflated the two meanings of the word in order to reach the holding of the
case. He used the former meaning when he drew an analogy to Board election procedures: "[T]he
Board defers decision on the eligibility of discharged employees to vote in a representation case, until
the awards are made." Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964) (emphasis ad-
ded). He used the latter meaning in his references to the Board's Raley's Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 256
(1963), and International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), decisions. 375 U.S. at 270-271
("If by the time the dispute reaches the Board, arbitration has already taken place, the Board shows
deference to the arbitral award. . . .") (emphasis added). Douglas' conflation of these two meanings
of "deference" gave unwarranted persuasiveness to the reasoning process by which the Court sanc-
tioned the development of the Board's own deference policies.
124. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
125. Id. at 1082.
126. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 850 n.32 (1971) (Jenkins, dissenting) (Board
has often decided "unilateral change of contract" cases despite availability of arbitration).
127. 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969).
128. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
129. Id. at 839.
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issues and apply the same substantive rules as would NLRB review, were
concerns that were disregarded. 130
The Board justified this extreme deference as supportive of the national
policy that favored voluntary settlement of labor disputes through arbitra-
tion."' The Board echoed the industrial pluralist vision of the workplace
as an independent, self-governed arena. The deference policy, it stated, is
"merely giving full effect to [the parties'] own voluntary agreements to
submit all such disputes to arbitration, rather than permitting such agree-
ments to be side-stepped and permitting the substitution of our own
processes, a forum not contemplated by their own agreement." 13 2 Citing
Lincoln Mills, the Board opinion in Collyer concluded that: "We believe
it to be consistent with the fundamental objectives of Federal law to re-
quire the parties here to honor their contractual obligations rather than,
by casting this dispute in statutory terms, to ignore their agreed-upon
procedures." '' 3
The potential scope of the Collyer decision was vast. As Jenkins
pointed out in dissent, almost any unfair labor practice could be construed
as a contract violation by means of broad construction of general clauses
in collective agreements."' Thus the Collyer decision had the potential to
strip the Board of its entire unfair labor practice jurisdiction.
Because the Collyer doctrine has enjoyed continuing support in the
courts, workers' access to the NLRB for the enforcement of their statutory
rights has been severely limited.3 5 Recently, the Board has cut back the
scope of Collyer deference as the industrial pluralist paradigm has come
under strain. '36 The courts, however, continue to require deference in all
130. Under Collyer, the Board retained limited jurisdiction to entertain a motion for reconsidera-
tion on the basis that the arbitration hearing did not measure up to the Spielburg standards of proce-
dural fairness. Id. at 843.
131. Id. at 840.
132. Id. at 842.
133. Id. at 843. The Collyer decision evoked vigorous dissents by two Board members, Fanning,
see id. at 846, and Jenkins, see id. at 850. Member Fanning pointed out that the decision flew in the
face of section 10(a) of the Act, which states that the Board's power to prevent unfair labor practices
"shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, law or otherwise." Id. at 849 (quoting National Labor Relations Act §
10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976)). In the Collyer case, in which no grievance had been filed, the
rationale that arbitration was the preferred forum of both parties did not make sense. See 192
N.L.R.B. at 846-47 (Fanning, dissenting); id. at 855 (Jenkins, dissenting). Furthermore, the Board's
remedies are entirely different from those of an arbitrator, and the arbitration process, unlike a hear-
ing before the Board, can be invoked only by the union, not by an individual worker. Id. at 855
(Jenkins, dissenting).
134. 192 N.L.R.B. at 855 (Jenkins, dissenting).
135. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980) (NLRB
abused its discretion in refusing to defer to arbitral award that upheld discharge of employee who
distributed leaflets to protest employer's piece-rate policies); Servair, Inc. v. NLRB, 102 L.R.R.M.
2705 (9th Cir. 1979) (NLRB abused its discretion by refusing to defer to arbitration award that
upheld discharge of 19 employees who struck in protest of firing of union activist).
136. See General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977), discussed in NLRB v. Pincus
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cases that involve overlapping jurisdiction." 7 The principle of deference,
as expressed in Collyer, formed a crucial leg in the triangular relationship
between the courts, arbitration, and the Board. With the full-blown con-
cept of deference and the limited judicial review of arbitration dictated by
the Steelworkers Trilogy, arbitration became, with certain limited excep-
tions,138 the only forum with jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of breaches
of collective bargaining agreements.
B. The Courts and the NLRB
Thus far we have seen the creation of two sides of the triangular rela-
tionship between the courts, the Board, and private arbitration. There is
yet a third side to the triangle: the relationship between the courts and the
NLRB. A primary feature of this relationship is contained in the preemp-
tion doctrine and the exceptions developed thereto. In the development of
these exceptions, what emerged was a further diminution of the Board's
unfair labor practice jurisdiction and a further affirmation of the primacy
of arbitration.
In Smith v. Evening News Association,'" the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with a claim of both a violation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment and an unfair labor practice. The employee sued his employer for
treating him differently from nonunion employees, in violation of a clause
in the collective agreement that said "'there shall be no discrimination
against any employee because of his [union] membership.' "10 This alle-
gation also stated a violation of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.' 41 Because
there was no arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement,
14 2
the Court could not have referred the dispute to arbitration under the
doctrine of the Steelworkers Trilogy. Rather, it had to decide whether to
resolve the dispute on the merits or to refuse jurisdiction in favor of the
NLRB. The Court accepted jurisdiction. In so doing, it refused to apply
its preemption doctrine, which acknowledges the NLRB's exclusive juris-
diction over activities arguably protected by the Act. *14 Instead, and with-
out explanation, the Court created an exception for a category of unfair
labor practices that are cognizable under section 301, and found concur-
Bros. Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 392-94 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
137. See NLRB v. Pincus Bros. Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 396-98 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (discussing cases in which courts upheld Board's deference policy).
138. See pp. 1535-37 infra (discussing exceptions).
139. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
140. Id. at 196 (quoting clause in employer's contract with Newspaper Guild of Detroit).
141. Id. at 197 n.5; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976) ("It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to . . . any term or condition of employment to en-
courage or discourage membership in any labor organization ... "
142. Id. at 196 n.l.
143. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
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rent jurisdiction in the courts and the NLRB for suits that involve
breaches of collective agreements.'4
The explanation for the exception can be found in the subsequent duty-
of-fair-representation cases, particularly in the milestone case of Vaca v.
Sipes.'45 In Vaca, an employee on sick leave for high blood pressure
wanted to return to work. Although his doctor permitted him to return,
the company doctor would not. He reported for work anyway and, upon
discovery, was fired. He filed a grievance, but the union, after investigat-
ing and concluding that the company doctor was right, refused to take the
case to arbitration. He then sued the union for a breach of its duty of fair
representation and claimed as damages the amount forfeited by the loss of
his job.
The case involved both a potential breach of duty by the union and a
potential breach of contract by the employer.'46 The Court ruled that the
employee could not sue the employer directly under section 301 because
there were grievance and arbitration procedures established in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. But because the union had thwarted his access
to those procedures, the employee could sue the union under section
8(b)(1) of the Act for breach of the duty of fair representation." 7 The
standard set to establish a union's breach of duty was failure to process
the grievance "in good faith and in a nonarbitrary manner."'48 Should the
employee prevail against the union, then and only then could the em-
ployee be heard on the merits of the underlying breach of contract claim
against the employer.
Vaca v. Sipes contains a lengthy discussion of the appropriate forum for
these combined breach of duty-breach of contract actions. The Court re-
lied on Smith to find concurrent jurisdiction with the Board over the
breach of contract part of the suit."49 But the Court took jurisdiction over
the breach of duty issue as well. Theoretically, this should have been a
matter exclusively for the Board, because the duty arises under the Act.
Under the NLRA, breach of duty is an unfair labor practice,5 0 and the
144. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962). Previously, the Court had
excepted section 301 actions from the Garmon rule, see, e.g., Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S.
238, 245 n.5 (1962); Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9
(1962); Dowd Box v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513 (1962), but in none of these was the preemption
issue necessary to the holding, see Smith v. Evening New Ass'n, 371 U.S. at 201-02 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
145. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
146. Id. at 173, 185-88.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 194-95. This standard has its roots in earlier suits that involved breaches of fair repre-
sentation. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330, 337 (1953).
149. 386 U.S. at 183-84.
150. See id. at 177 (discussing cases that developed duty, which is "grounded in federal statutes");
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preemption doctrine should have relegated the issue to the Board."'
Only one of the reasons given for the Court's jurisdiction over the
union's breach of duty is persuasive. The Court said that some aspects of
the contract claim may depend on issues raised by the breach of duty
claim. 2 This is particularly true for the issue of remedy. The damage
formula the court devised was that the union is liable for the amount by
which its conduct enhanced the employees' injury resulting from the em-
ployer's breach. Based on this formula, the Court argued that because the
section 301 action is justiciable under Smith, the breach of duty action
should be as well. In that way, a remedy can be fashioned against both
defendants at the same time. Otherwise, "the Board would be compelled
in many cases either to remedy injuries arising out of a breach of contract
• ..or to leave the individual employee without remedy for the union's
wrong."'
53
The result in Vaca made it clear that the Court did not want to relegate
the breach of contract question to the Board under any circumstances.
When faced with a choice of forum to decide a dispute combining breach
of duty and breach of contract issues, the Court disimissed factors that
argued for exclusive Board jurisdiction and found concurrent jurisdiction
instead. The interdependency of the claims, the fact that the union's
breach of duty is exclusively a statutory violation, and the Board's section
10(a) mandate to prevent all unfair labor practices notwithstanding other
means of prevention would have been ample reasons to give the entire suit
to the NLRB, should the Court have been so inclined.
The reason why the Court made this choice when faced with an over-
lap of jurisdiction between the courts and the Board can be found in the
substance of the controversy involved. Once the Court decided, as it had in
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, that an individual had enforceable rights
Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 188 (1962), enforcement denied sub. nom. NLRB v. Miranda
Fuel Co., Inc., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (Board's first interpretation of § 8(b) to include union's
breach of duty of fair representation as unfair labor practice).
151. See 386 U.S. at 202-03 (Fortas, J., concurring) (breach of statutory duty is unfair labor
practice).
152. Id. at 187. The other two reasons given were that fair representation questions would often
require a review of substantive positions taken by the union at negotiations and in its handling of the
grievance machinery, matters "not normally within the Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction," id.
at 181, and that the General Counsel has unreviewable discretion over the issuance or nonissuance of
a complaint, id. at 182-83. The first reason is simply wrong. The Board's entire section 8(b) jurisdic-
tion authorizes it to scrutinize the substantive activities of unions in collective bargaining and in the
handling of grievances. The second reason merely states that the General Counsel might abuse its
discretion, a danger inherent in any delegation of authority to an administrative agency. Furthermore,
such abuse of discretion is reviewable under the rule of Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) (court
may review and reverse decision of NLRB that exceeds its delegated powers).
153. 386 U.S. at 187-88 (footnote omitted).
154. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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under section 301 to sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement,' 5
then individual suits in which a breach of the duty of fair representation
was also alleged raised a new problem. Because unions control access to
the grievance and arbitration processes, merely to refer such cases back to
the parties' own institutions of self-government, as the Steelworkers Tril-
ogy prescribes, would defeat the duty of fair representation altogether. A
breach of this duty is a dysfunction that undermines the integrity of the
arbitration mechanism. Therefore, an exception to the principle of arbitral
finality and exclusivity was required.
Any exception to the national labor policy of the Steelworkers Trilogy
for duty of fair representation cases was, however, an exception capable of
swallowing the rule. Such suits could be used by an aggrieved worker to
challenge every union decision concerning grievances, and thereby to se-
cure a ruling from an outside forum on the merits of the contract claim.
The only limiting factor in the individual's ability to secure outside adju-
dication of his contract claim would be the standard set for proving a
breach of the union's duty. If the standard were set low, then a breach
would be relatively easy to establish and the contract claim would have to
be heard, thus undermining the entire principle of the exclusivity and the
finality of arbitration. In order to keep this exception within bounds and
to prevent the demise of the doctrines of the Steelworkers Trilogy, the
Court decided to retain jurisdiction over these hybrid breach of duty-
breach of contract actions.
C. The Labor Injunction
Industrial pluralism thus dictated a unique set of institutional arrange-
ments between the courts, the NLRB, and arbitration. The relationship
between the courts and arbitration was defined by the Steelworkers Tril-
ogy hands-off policy, which was supportive of arbitration; between the
Board and arbitration by the Collyer doctrine of deference to arbitration;
and between the Board and the courts by the Smith v. Evening News rule
of concurrent jurisdiction for section 301 suits. These interrelationships
made arbitration the only forum to hear most actions that involve breach
of labor-management contracts; by themselves, however, they were not
self-effectuating. Workers still retained the right to strike, guaranteed by
155. Another aspect of the Smith decision was the interpretation of section 301 to embrace suits
brought by individuals as well as by unions to enforce collective bargaining agreements. Section 301
reads in part: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees . . . may be brought in any district court . . . ." 29 U.S.C. §185 (a) (1976). The
Smith decision interpreted the word "between" as modifying "contracts" rather than "suits." 371 U.S.
at 200. By so interpreting the statutory language, the Court held that an individual could sue to
enforce a right contained in a collective agreement. Id. For a critique of this aspect of the holding in
Smith, see Ratner, Some Contemporary Observations on Section 301, 52 GEO. L.J. 260, 260 (1964).
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the Norris-LaGuardia Act"' and by section 13 of the National Labor Re-
lations Act.157 Although Douglas asserted that arbitration was a quid pro
quo for an agreement not to strike,"5 " arbitration in fact sometimes proved
ineffective because it was often too slow to prevent or to remedy a
breach." 9 In such cases, strikes over employer breaches occurred.
In Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,10 the union protested
a company decision to assign supervisors to perform bargaining unit work.
When the company refused to reverse its decision, the union went on
strike. At that point, the employer sought arbitration of its alleged right to
assign the supervisors to unit work, and sought to enjoin the strike.'" In
deciding that an injunction should issue, the Supreme Court gave the in-
dustrial pluralist edifice a solid foundation-the equitable power of the
Court.162
The availability of injunctive relief to force a union to cease striking
pending arbitration was a powerful boost to arbitration. It meant that the
quid pro quo relationship asserted by Douglas in Lincoln Mills was not a
relationship of consent but rather one of compulsion.' The union's alter-
native economic weapons were withdrawn. The court had stated earlier
that a promise not to strike would be implied in an agreement containing
an arbitration clause. 6 ' Furthermore, because the Court stated in Boys
Market that injunctive relief was only available when there was an ex-
press or implied no-strike clause in the collective agreement,'65 the deci-
sion was an incentive to employers to include arbitration clauses in their
156. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976).
158. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957); see Local 174, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-06 (1962) (court may find no-strike clause
implicit in collective bargaining agreement to extent that area of dispute is exclusively covered by
compulsory terminal arbitration).
159. Employer breaches of collective bargaining agreements usually take the form of unilateral
actions instituted in spite of union objection. Some such actions may have immediate and irreparable
consequences for employees, such as the subcontracting of bargaining-unit work, the closing of part of
the employer's facility, or the operation of a plant in the face of a serious safety hazard. In such a
situation, the delay entailed by waiting for an arbitral hearing and award may effectively extinguish
the union's contractual rights. See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Union, 554
F.2d 115, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1976); Pittsburgh Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union v. Pittsburgh
Press Co., 479 F.2d 607, 609 (3d Cir. 1973); Local Div. 1098, Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees
v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, 225 F. Supp. 28, 31 (D.D.C. 1963); Letter Carriers Branch 352 v. U.S.
Postal Service, 88 L.R.R.M. 2678, 2678-79 (S.D. Iowa 1975); IUE v. Radio Corp. of America, 77
L.R.R.M. 2201, 2204 (D.N.J. 1971).
160. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
161. Id. at 238-40.
162. See id. at 253.
163. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
164. Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-06 (1962) (strike
over dispute consigned to arbitration by collective bargaining agreement violates agreement even in
absence of no-strike clause); see Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 380-84 (1974) (duty to
arbitrate gives rise to implied no-strike obligation enforceable by injunction).
165. See Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248, 253 (1970).
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agreements. 66 The subsequent decision in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers'67 took this rationale even further by holding that Boys Mar-
ket injunctions were only authorized when the arbitration clause in the
collective bargaining agreement covered that dispute. Thus employers who
otherwise might want to keep certain areas outside the scope of the griev-
ance procedure and under their unilateral control, now might decide it
was preferable to make such issues arbitrable, and hence enjoinable in the
event of a work stoppage.'68
There are other reasons why the use of the injunction was consistent
with, if not necessitated by, the institutional structure that was emerging
at the time. Once the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements was
turned over to private arbitrators, the problem of remedies for breach be-
came problematic. Under the NLRA, the Board has a whole panoply of
possible enforcement devices both before and after any hearing. These in-
clude access to company premises, the power to subpoena records, the au-
thority to issue cease-and-desist orders punishable by fines for willful in-
terference, the ability to withdraw certification for unlawful union
conduct, and the power to order bargaining in the absence of a union
election when there has been company conduct inherently destructive of
employee rights. 69 The Board has wide remedial latitude because the
NLRA is a multi-faceted intervention into the relationship between the
company and the union. Each facet gives the Board a lever with which to
enforce the rights conferred by the Act.
Arbitration, on the other hand, is a brittle tool for remedying breaches
of collective agreements. An arbitrator can merely issue an award. An
arbitrator has no prehearing power to intervene in a dispute. When arbi-
tration processes are too slow to preserve the rights of either side, the only
alternative under the industrial pluralist structure is to seek equitable re-
lief. This limitation on the remedial powers of arbitration had lead the
Court in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,'70 to say that "if injunctions
are necessary, [possibly] the whole idea of enforcement of these agree-
ments by private suits should be discarded in favor of enforcement
through the administrative machinery of the Labor Board."'7 Boys Mar-
ket overruled Sinclair Refining,' seriously undermining the Norris-La-
166. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 409-12 (1976).
167. Id.
168. See Rabin, Limitations on Employer Independent Actions, 27 VAND. L. REV. 133, 181
(1974).
169. 29 U.S.C. §§ 160, 161 (1976); see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610-616
(1969); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187-89 (1941).
170. 370 U.S. 195 (1962) (Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents use of injunctive relief to enforce col-
lective bargaining agreements).
171. Id. at 214.
172. 398 U.S. 235, 253-55 (1970).
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Guardia Act at the same time.
D. The Structure Collapses
Although the industrial pluralist paradigm provided a consistent
framework within which to allocate functions between the competing fo-
rums that regulate labor relations, the structure was unstable from its in-
ception, and with time, the strains began to show. Paradoxically, the very
cases that defined the structure at the same time signaled its demise.
Vaca v. Sipes,' for example, was the ultimate statement by the Court
on the treatment of suits that allege both breach of contract and breach of
the duty of fair representation. But once individuals possessed the right
under section 301 to sue on the contract in the event of a breach of the
duty of fair representation, the finality of arbitration was threatened. Ini-
tially, Vaca was applied only to suits in which a union failed to bring a
case to arbitration in violation of its fair representation duty. In Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight Inc., 74 however, the Court expanded the doctrine
to include cases in which the union had acted improperly in the conduct of
the arbitration itself. Arbitral finality, in such a case, was lost.
David Feller, in his classic work, A General Theory of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement,"'5 argued that in a Vaca-type case, the employee
should not be entitled to a judicial decision on the merits of his grievance,
but rather should be entitled to a court order directing the union to pro-
ceed to arbitration. He based this on the logic of industrial pluralism,
stating that "[a] court should not determine whether the grievance
presents an arguable tenable claim for breach of contract, because arbitra-
tion is not being sought as an alternative forum for such a claim, but as
the performance of the only promise made.""', After Hines, in which the
Court held that an employee can challenge a completed arbitration under
section 301, Feller's proposal no longer makes sense. Arbitration is no
longer a cure-all because a union's good faith cannot be presumed. If
there has been a breach of the duty of fair representation in the conduct of
the arbitration, simply ordering another arbitration will not remedy the
situation.
The ability of individuals to attack a union's handling of grievance and
arbitration decisions under section 301 presents a major problem for in-
dustrial pluralism. Under the industrial pluralist theory, a union must be
given a wide range of discretion to trade-off interests of groups of employ-
173. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
174. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
175. 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 801-02 (1973).
176. Id. at 801 (emphasis added).
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ees within its bargaining unit177 and to make judgments about the treat-
ment of individual grievances. 178 Otherwise, it cannot represent the collec-
tive interest. 79 Permitting individuals to attack union decisions and
independently to litigate contract issues undermines the notion of group
representation, for "what was made collectively could be promptly un-
made individually.""" The more vested rights an individual has under a
collective agreement, the less power the union has to bind its constituents
at the bargaining table and in grievance conferences. If the standard for
establishing a breach of the duty were high, perhaps this would not be a
problem. But some courts have gone so far as to impose a negligence stan-
dard on unions, finding a breach of duty whenever the union's behavior is
short of "due care." '' In such a case, the industrial pluralist notion that
the Act protects collective rights rather than individual rights becomes
strained.
The breach of the duty of fair representation poses problems for indus-
trial pluralism precisey- because of, the choice of private forums for the
adjudication of contract disputes. If such disputes were adjudicated by the
NLRB, any party-union or individual-could initiate an action;' there
could be no breach of a union's duty in handling and settling grievances.
Furthermore, the Board could easily join the union, the individual, and
the employer in such an action in order to provide a remedy consistent
both with the union's responsibility for administering the collective agree-
ment and with the individual employee's unique circumstances.8 3
In the area of labor injunctions, there also has been an implosion of the
industrial pluralist vision. The decision in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 77084 made injunctive relief available to remedy a union's
breach of its no-strike obligation and thus to compel arbitration. The deci-
sion, however, was ambiguous: is the injunction intended to stop the
breach or to force arbitration? If the injunction is against the breach, then
177. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-338 (1953).
178. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964).
179. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1944); Ratner, supra note 155, at 260,
260-61.
180. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 346 (1944).
181. See, e.g., Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 957, 580 F.2d 232, 235 (6th
Cir. 1978); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975); Schum v. South
Buffalo Ry. Co., 496 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1974); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packing-
house, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 'sub noma. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Figueroa de
Arroyo, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
182. Under the Act, complaints may be brought by any "person," and any other "person" may be
allowed to intervene in the same proceeding. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976). "Person" is defined as "one
or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives,
trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers." 29 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976).
183. Section 160(b) gives the Board authority to join other parties in a pending proceeding. 29
U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
184. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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presumably any employer or union breach of agreement that produces im-
minent irreparable harm also should be enjoinable. Many courts have ac-
cepted this reasoning and issued "reverse-Boys Market injunctions" in or-
der to prevent unilateral employer action, that violated a collective
bargaining agreement and that threatened irreparable harm."'5 By so do-
ing, the courts in effect enforced the collective bargaining agreements.
In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,'86 the Supreme Court ex-
pressed disapproval of such injunctions because they permit the court "to
hold hearings, make findings of fact, interpret the applicable provisions of
the contract and issue injunctions so as to restore the status quo, or to
otherwise regulate the relationship of the parties . . .. This would...
make the courts potential participants in a wide range of arbitrable dis-
putes . -,. Indeed, the Court in Buffalo Forge correctly noted that
the availability of injunctive relief for employer breaches necessarily em-
broils the Court in interpreting collective bargaining agreements in order
to specify breaches and define the status quo ante. It was precisely to
avoid this task that the Court established the doctrines of the Steelworkers
Trilogy. Therefore, the Buffalo Forge Court made it appear that the Boys
Market injunction was available, not to enjoin a breach, but only to force
arbitration.
If, however, Boys Market does not involve an injunction against a
breach, but merely an injunction to force arbitration, then the availability
of injunctive relief must be limited to cases in which the arbitration itself
is jeopardized by one party's breach.'88 The inquiry then should become
not only whether there was a union or an employer breach, but also
whether it was a breach that would make arbitration impossible or futile.
That later step, however, was not part of the inquiry in the Boys Market
decision. Was Boys Market wrongly decided?
In Boys Market, there was no allegation or suggestion by the Court
that the union's breach of its no-strike pledge jeopardized arbitration. In-
deed, the employer could presumably have expedited arbitration and
thereby ended the strike itself. Was the Court stating a sub-rosa presump-
185. See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 122-23
(4th Cir. 1976); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. U.S. Postal Service, 88 L.R.R.M. 2678, 2679
(S.D. Iowa 1975); IUE v. Radio Corp. of America, 77 L.R.R.M. 2201, 2204 (D.N.J. 1971); Local
Div. 1098, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, 225 F. Supp. 28, 31
(D.D.C. 1963); see Gould, On Labor Injunctions Pending Arbitration: Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30
STAN. L. REV. 533, 552-61 (1978); Payne, Enjoining Employers Pending Arbitration-From M-K-T
to Greyhound and Beyond, 3 INDUS. REL. L. J. 169, 172 (1979); Simon, Injunctive Relief to Main-
tain the Status Quo Pending Arbitration: A Union Practitioner's View, 29 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 317,
317-42 (1976).
186. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
187. Id. at 410 (footnote omitted).
188. See Payne, supra note 185, at 214 n.246; Simon, supra note 185, at 337-42.
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tion that any strike by a union in violation of a no-strike pledge threatens
to undermine arbitration? If so, on what basis?
Subsequent decisions applying Buffalo Forge and Boys Market have
been inconsistent about the meaning of these rulings. At least one court of
appeals has interpreted Buffalo Forge in a reverse-Boys Market situation
to state a presumption that union breaches of no-strike pledges imperil the
arbitral process, but that employer breaches of collective agreements do
not.1"9 One district court, however, has said that Buffalo Forge has no
applicability to any situation except that of sympathy strikes,190 and one
circuit has applied Boys Market injunctions to any breaches by employer
or union that threaten to render arbitration a "hollow formality."'"
Whichever way the reverse-Boys Market cases are ultimately decided,
the issue will pose a problem for industrial pluralist theory. If such suits
are permitted and injunctive relief is equally available to management and
labor, courts increasingly will have to confront problems of contract inter-
pretation in contravention of the Steelworkers Trilogy. If such suits are
curtailed by a presumption that only union breaches imperil arbitration,
the appearance of neutrality that courts adopt under industrial pluralism
will be seriously compromised, and the quid pro quo will become a great
deal more quid than quo.
The internal inconsistencies emerging in the application of industrial
pluralist theory to legal cases are indicative of flaws in the theory itself.
The procedural interpretation of the Act urged by the pluralists cannot
free the courts from confronting substantive issues of labor-management
relations. Although these flaws are now surfacing, no one has yet sug-
gested that the theory be discarded. Instead, courts and commmentators
continue to invoke its rhetoric and to apply the doctrine, while rendering
decisions that undermine its rationale.
192
IV. The Premise of Joint Sovereignty
In order to understand the current doctrinal confusion in labor law, it is
first necessary to understand the ways in which the theory is flawed and
189. Amalgamated Transit Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1237, 1238 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).
190. Communications Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 430 F. Supp. 969, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
191. Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 123 (4th Cir.
1976).
192. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980); Boise Cascade
Corp. v. United Steelworkers Local 7001, 588 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979);
Feller, supra note 80, at 99-102 (arbitration is integral part of industrial self-government); Kaden,
Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 274-
277 (1980) (labor and management have institutional stake in arbitral finality); c. Note, Union Lia-
bility for Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REV. 702, 703-707 (1980) (advocating unions' Title
VII liability for employment discrimination based on unions' role in collective bargaining).
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the reasons why courts and commentators refuse to acknowledge its im-
pending demise. Central to the industrial pluralist view of the NLRA-as
merely establishing a democratic framework within which labor relations
occur rather than as endowing substantive rights-is the proposition that
labor and management jointly determine workplace conditions by negoti-
ating a collective bargaining agreement. Through private negotiations, la-
bor and capital compromise their own self-interest and arrive at mutually
agreeable terms for their services. Government intervention is limited to
facilitating the negotiations; it does not dictate the terms that result.,
This view of industrial relations assumes that labor and management
come to the bargaining table not only in an adversarial position, but also
out of mutual need and with comparable power. The fact of negotiations
alone, however, does not ensure that one party has not dictated terms to
the other. Labor and management have different powers at the bargaining
table, powers partially determined by the law itself. ' These disparities
affect the extent to which the agreement can be said to have been "jointly"
settled. In addition, the agenda of the negotiations-that is, what issues
are put up for discussion-is constrained by practical and legal barriers.
The industrial pluralists have recognized the fragile character of joint
sovereignty in the industrial workplace. Their writings reflect a concern
that the removal of certain issues from the collective bargaining process
and the relegation of those issues to management's exclusive prerogative
effectively can negate the mutuality of decisionmaking in industrial life.
Examination of the pluralists' attempts to reconcile a belief in retained
management prerogatives with the premise of joint sovereignty reveals a
fundamental incoherency in the pluralist worldview.
A. The Duty to Bargain
Prior to the Wagner Act, the existence of joint control by management
and labor resulted directly from the assertion of joint power: without
roughly equal power, there was nothing to compel bargaining in the first
place. Consider, for example, the following description of collective bar-
gaining written in 1922:
Every trade union, .. when it becomes strong enough to contest
the power of the employers in the industry in which it operates, en-
ters into joint conferences or conventions with them. Ordinarily it is
193. Cox, Reflections, supra note 83, at 1517; Feller, supra note 80, at 101-02; Shulman, supra
note 19, at 1024.
194. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(b)(4), (6), (7), 8(e), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4),
(6), (7), 158(e) (1976) (limiting tactics available to unions); pp. 1542-44 supra (discussion of Boys
Markets and Buffalo Forge). But see National Labor Relations Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976)
(preserving right to strike).
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the employers who refuse to meet the union representatives and they
have to be forced to confer by means of a strike. Sometimites, how-
ever, when a union grows suddenly strong, it attempts to substitute
its dictation for that of the employers. In such cases the latter usually
shut down their plants, and thus the revolutionary unions are forced
by the employers to hold conferences and jointly determine condi-
tions of employment.
The condition that always brings these conferences about is the
equalizing of bargaining power between the wage earners and the
employers.
195
The Wagner Act superimposes a legal framework on this reality.
Under the Wagner Act, the employer is obliged to bargain not because the
union has "persuaded" him to, but because the law requires him to do
so.196 He is not required to bargain before a union has been certified, and
the process of winning certification is itself a power contest. 197 The Act
also alters the exercise of workers' power once a union is certified. In
order to retain the protection of the law, the union must surrender many
of its economic weapons. The right to strike is restricted or impliedly
waived; secondary boycotts and sympathy strikes are prohibited. 98
The employers' economic weapons, however, are not similarly curtailed
by the law. Employer direct action persists in many forms. He can lock
out his employees. 199 He also can weaken the union by discharging shop
leaders, reducing wages, laying off part of the work force, or changing the
production methods. 20 The Act does not prohibit these "tactics" unless
done with a specific and provable anti-union intent.21 As one union offi-
cial has said: "In principle, the action of an employer in putting a decision
into effect over the protest of his employees is as much 'direct action' and
195. Leiserson, supra note 22, at 60-61.
196. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
197. See Oliver, The Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 206, 208 (1934) (union
election campaigns, though initially sparked by dissatisfaction with specific conditions of employment,
are ultimately attempts to limit absolute power of employer).
198. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). See also Lynd, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activ-
ity After Union Recognition: A Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. L. REV. 720, 720-30 (1975)
(union recognition limits workers to economic weapons); Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Repre-
sentation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished? 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 897, 900-01 (1975) (judicial interpretation of § 7 has restricted unions' ability to exert economic
pressure).
199. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310-12 (1965).
200. Such unilateral employer acts are permitted by the Act if there is no provable intent to
discourage union membership or if they are not found to be inherently destructive of important em-
ployee rights. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967); NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963).
201. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967); American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965); c. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976) (prohibiting discrimination by
employers against union members).
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open conflict as is the strike.) 20 2
Thus, the NLRA has transformed the economic conflict that marked
labor relations prior to its passage. The Act guarantees the company's
presence at the bargaining table, but despite the mandate in its statement




anything, it places limits on many of the traditional sources of the union's
strength. The negotiation process no longer accurately reflects the power
position of the parties. Instead, it is a form of shadowboxing in which the
economic strength of each is modified by legal sanction. The economic
weapons, of uncertain value and potency, are kept in the closet, out of the
sight of the law. This is why negotiation often appears to be less a contest
of economic power and more an exercise in gamesmanship tempered by
the conventions of "good faith." In this shadowboxing match, the plural-
ists see the basis of joint sovereignty between labor and management.
There, the union participates in the formation of the rules of modem
industrial enterprise, but not necessarily on an equal footing.05
B. Narrowing the Realm of Joint Sovereignty
Even if it is accepted that joint sovereignty in the industrial pluralist
theory does not mean the equalization of power, other problems challenge
the coherency of the premise. The law restricts the sphere of joint sover-
eignty by limiting the scope of the duty to bargain. Management need not
negotiate about all issues that the union wants to discuss. Some topics are
excluded altogether as impermissible subjects for negotiations; 2 ' others are
divided into two categories: mandatory and permissive.207 The duty to
bargain extends only to subjects the Supreme Court considers
"mandatory. 2 08 For those deemed "permissive," the union has only a lim-
ited right to compel negotiations. Bargaining on permissive items cannot
202. Oliver, supra note 197, at 211.
203. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937); National Labor Relations
Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
204. Cf First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573, 2579 (1981) (dictum) ("Con-
gress had no expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal partner in the
running of the business enterprise in which the union's members are employed.")
205. Cf Shulman, supra note 19, at 1002-04 (unions and employers establish rules to guide
massive and complex enterprises).
206. See NLRB v. American Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 405 n.15 (1952).
207. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348 (1958) (bargaining is
mandatory only with respect to "'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment' ")
(quoting National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976)). In practice, the
mandatory-permissive distinction is less significant than it appears, because a union may find a way at
negotiations to hold out on a mandatory item but, at the same time, to let management know that if it
yields on a permissive item, agreement can be achieved. If no agreement is reached, however, and a
strike ensues, the Labor Board will penetrate the parties' official positions to determine whether it was
a protected or unprotected strike.
208. 356 U.S. at 349.
1547
The Yale Law Journal
go to impasse, and thus those items cannot be the subject of a protected
strike.2 9 Moreover, the Act allows the company to make unilateral
changes in permissive items during the contract term.
210
Not all the issues of importance to unions are within the scope of
mandatory bargaining.2n Perhaps the most important limitations are those
related to employer subcontracting, and the introduction of new technol-
ogy. 212 In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,2 1 the concurring
opinion of Justices Stewart, Douglas, and Harlan emphasized that the
duty to bargain does not extend to management decisions that "lie at the
core of entrepreneurial control . . .[including] [d]ecisions concerning the
commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise.
'21
Since 1971, the NLRB has adopted this position and has not required a
company to bargain over investment decisions.1 Most recently, the Su-
preme Court has applied the logic of Fibreboard to hold in First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB that a company is not required to bargain
over a decision to shut down part of its operation.
2
16
C. The Problem of Retained Rights
Even within this narrowed sphere of joint sovereignty, the law is still
ambiguous on the issue of whether the union is entitled to an equal voice
in the governance of the workplace. This issue comes up repeatedly in the
conflict over the scope of management rights. It goes to the very heart of
the industrial pluralists' conception of collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining agreements specify certain rights and obligations
in the workplace. Much is left unspecified, however, and this prompts the
question: do all items not enumerated in the collective agreement fall
within the sphere of joint sovereignty or within the "core of en-
trepreneurial control?" Many important issues lie within this nether
space. For example, practices in existence when an agreement is negoti-
209. See Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965) (neither party
required to bargain about permissive subjects).
210. Allied Chem. Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 187-88 (1971)
(bargaining over retired employees pension benefits not mandatory and therefore subject to unilateral
change by employer during contract term).
211. E.g., id.
212. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1964) (subcontract-
ing); Lufkin Foundry & Mach. Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 187, 195 (1970) (change in technology).
213. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). The Supreme Court held that the employer violated the duty to bar-
gain by refusing to negotiate with the union over its decision to subcontract out bargaining-unit work.
Id. at 215. The decision was restricted, however, to instances of subcontracting that did not involve
new capital investment or reorganization of plant operations. Id. at 213.
214. Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
215. See Lynd, Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
396, 402 (1979); Rabin, supra note 168, at 153.
216. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573, 2584 (1981).
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ated are usually not mentioned in the agreement. Such practices include
rules about the time of various shifts, the existence of wash-up time, the
right to receive phone calls during the day, the availability of locker and
shower facilities, sick leave policy, the right to refuse overtime, Christmas
bonuses, vacation schedules, the freedom to smoke on the job, and innu-
merable other items. Under current law, it is unclear whether a unilateral
employer change in such practices constitutes an arbitrable grievance, and
if so, how an arbitrator should interpret the agreement's silence. One po-
sition-the retained rights of management approach-is that only viola-
tions of explicit contractual provisions are arbitrable. The opposing posi-
tion-the joint sovereignty approach-is that the agreement includes all
existing conditions and practices, so that any unilateral change is subject
to arbitration. The answer depends on whether there is a duty to bargain
about such items during the term of an existing agreement.
Section 8(d) of the Act limits the section 8(a)(5) and section 8(b)(3)
duty to bargain by allowing a party to refuse to discuss or to agree to
modifications to an existing contract.1 7 Section 8(d) was added to the
Taft-Hartley Amendments in reaction to the Board's view that the duty to
bargain continued despite the existence of a written agreement. 218 In 1949,
the Board reinterpreted the duty to bargain in the light of section 8(d) in
the case of In re Allied Mills, Inc.21 9 There the Board adopted the view
that section 8(d) referred only to items specified in the written agreement,
and that the duty to bargain continued for all "unwritten terms dealing
with 'wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment.' ,,220
This view represented a rejection of the retained rights approach, and an
adoption of the joint sovereignty approach to the statutory language.2 1
Two years later, however, the Board retreated from this position. In
Jacobs Manufacturing Co. 222 it held that the duty to bargain does not
apply to matters covered in the collective agreement or discussed in negoti-
ations. 23 Since then the Board and the courts have been inconsistent in
determining the scope of section 8(d) and the duty to bargain.2 In par-
217. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
218. Cf Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 1947) (rejecting
NLRB's determination that there is continuous statutory obligation to bargain that exists indepen-
dently of all contractual obligations, and that breach of contract on part of union does not relieve
employer from this obligation).
219. 82 N.L.R.B. 854 (1949).
220. Id. at 862.
221. But see Cox & Dunlop, supra note 84, at 1108 (Board should resolve claims that employer
or union refused to bargain about interpretation or application of existing agreement only when con-
tract contains no applicable grievance procedure).
222. 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
223. Id. at 1219.
224. See Rabin, supra note 168, at 177-79 (Board and courts have applied Jacobs Manufacturing
doctrine and related rules inconsistently).
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ticular, the question: of which existing terms and conditions should be con-
sidered part of the contract, and thus excluded by section 8(d) from fur-
ther mandatory negotiations, is still unresolved.
25
Sometimes the parties have tried to settle this question themselves in
negotiations by inserting into the contract a "zipper clause." Such a clause
states that there is no duty to bargain about any matter not covered by the
agreement. The Board has often refused to enforce such clauses, however,
on the grounds that they are too broad a waiver of the union's statutory
right.2  Another method used to resolve the continual deadlocks over this
question has been the inclusion of a definition of what constitutes an arbi-
trable grievance in the agreement itself. Management-rights clauses2 and
past-practice clauses provide such definitions.22s Those clauses, however,
225. Compare NLRB v. Scam Instrument Corp., 394 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1968), enforcing
163 N.L.R.B. 284 (1967) (unilateral employer midterm modification of collective agreement is unfair
labor practice) with United Tel. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 779, 780-81 (1955) (unilateral employer action in
accord with its interpretation of collective agreement is not modification and thus is not subject to duty
to bargain).
226. See, e.g., Unit Drop Forge Div. of Eaton Yale & Towne Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 600, 601 (1968)
(when contract includes general waiver of union's right to bargain, that waiver will be given effect
only if matter in issue was fully discussed and union consciously yielded or clearly waived its intent in
matter).
227. Management-rights clauses are clauses which appear in collective bargaining agreements
that specify the rights management retains under the agreement. Not all agreements contain such
clauses, and those that do appear to vary greatly. Examples of management rights clauses are:
The Union and the Locals recognize that subject only to the express provisions of this
Agreement, the supervision, management, and control of the Company's business, operations,
and plants are exclusively the function of the Company. (General Electric Co. and Electrical
Workers [UE]; exp. 10/69) ...
It is understood and agreed that the Company has all the customary and usual rights, pow-
ers, functions and authority of management.
Any of the rights, powers, functions or authority which the Company had prior to the sign-
ing of this agreement, or any agreement with the Union, including those in respect of rates of
pay, hours of employment or conditions of work, are retained by the Company, except as those
rights, powers, functions or authority are specifically abridged or modified by this agreement
or by any supplement to this agreement arrived at through the process of collective bargaining.
(Timken Roller Bearing Co. and Steelworkers; exp. 8/68)
The Company retains the sole right to manage its business, and direct the working force,
including by way of illustration, but not limited to the rights to decide the machine and tool
equipment, the materials to be processed, the methods of processing, the schedule of produc-
tion, together with all designing, engineering, and the control of raw materials, semi-manufac-
tured and finished parts which may be incorporated into the products manufactured; to main-
tain order and efficiency in its plants and operations; to hire, layoff, assign, transfer, and
promote employees, and to determine the starting and quitting time and the number of hours
to be worked, subject only to such regulations governing the exercise of these rights as are
expressly provided in this Agreement. (Commercial Steel Treating Corp. and Auto Workers;
exp. 3/70).
R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, & D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION
314-16 (1970) (quoting 2 BNA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS § 65, at
11-14 (1969)).
228. Past practices clauses state that preexisting conditions and practices in a workplace will be
continued during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. Examples of such clauses include:
Should there be any local working conditions in effect which have existed regularly over a
period of time under the applicable circumstances and which provide benefits that are in excess
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pose similar problems of conflicting interpretations. A management-rights
clause may be construed to include only enumerated rights, or it may be
construed to encompass unforeseeable circumstances as well as specified
circumstances. Past-practice clauses present problems of deciding which
practices are included. For example, should management be able to invoke
practices in effect before there was collective bargaining, and thus be able
to benefit from its prior period of unilateral control? Or should past prac-
tices be limited to the union's lifetime in that shop?
Furthermore, neither of these clauses settles the question of the scope of
the duty to bargain and to arbitrate. Does the absence of explicitly enu-
merated practices mean that particular practices should be deemed in-
cluded or deemed excluded? And does the lack of either clause mean that
there are no management rights or no past practices? Moreover, agree-
ments frequently contain both clauses, compounding the problem of
interpretation.
The problem does not stop with the question of arbitrability. Once a
practice is determined to be within the duty to arbitrate, an arbitrator
must decide on the merits. Considerable anguish and ink has been spent
by arbitrators on these questions. If their job is to interpret the agreement,
they must have a notion of what the agreement is. How an arbitrator
rules on a given question is a statement about which side controls the
unwritten terms.
The problem recurs when the arbitrator weighs the evidence he re-
ceives. There is a commonly accepted doctrine among arbitrators that a
worker who is aggrieved by a company order that he believes violates the
agreement must obey first and then file a grievance.2 2 ' This doctrine was
announced in an arbitration decision by Harry Shulman in In re Ford
Motor Co., Spring & Upset Building.2 0 Given this sequence, an arbitra-
tor is likely to be "influenced by the weight of the accomplished fact. 23
Management often uses this reasoning to bolster its argument that "the
Company's right to manage requires that union grievances be extra well-
of or in addition to the benefits established by this Agreement, they shall remain in effect for
the term of this Agreement, except as they are changed or eliminated by mutual agreement or
in accordance with Subparagraph (d) of this Section 3.
Id. at 266 (quoting Republic Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers Local 1375 (Mar. 17, 1962) (Ryder,
Arb.)), and "The exercise by the Company of any such [management] functions will be in accordance
with the established past practices previously agreed to and all other provisions of this Agreement," id.
at 317.
229. See note 300 infra; Bamburg, Insubordination, 1949 WASH. U. L.Q. 154, 158; Murphy,
Introduction, in M. STONE, LABOR GRIEVANCES AND DECISIONS at xv, xix (1965); c. Walker v. City
of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320 (1967) (protesters must obey injunction issued to enforce unconsti-
tutional ordinance and challenge its constitutionality afterwards).
230. 3 Lab. Arb. Rep. 779, 780 (1944).
231. Goldberg, Management's Reserved Rights: A Labor View in MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND
THE ARBITRATION PROCESS 118, 121 (J. McKelvey ed. 1956).
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founded to justify interference with this right." '
The dispute over the scope of management rights undermines the plu-
ralists' premise of joint sovereignty. Logically, pluralists should favor bar-
gaining over all the conditions of the workplace that affect workers, re-
quiring joint assent for any changes in these conditions, and arbitrating
grievances over unilateral changes. Such a position, however, would open
up all issues to conflict and to escalated social warfare. None of the plu-
ralists have gone this far.233 The pluralists also reject the opposite view of
the management rights issue: the position of pure retained rights. The
pluralists do not contend that management retains unilateral control over
all items not explicitly bargained away in the written agreement,' be-
cause that position would remove most of the issues of industrial life from
the sphere of joint sovereignty. Their attempts to find a stable middle
ground, however, have failed.
D. The Pluralists' Response
The pluralists need a defensible middle ground in order to show that
there is truly a realm of joint sovereignty with identifiable boundaries
within which the union has a genuine right to joint input into company
decisions. If the realm of management control cannot be separated from
the realm of joint control, then the union's input is not by right, but only
by management's acquiescence, and is subject to extinction at any time.
Harry Shulman, who for years served as the arbitrator between the
Ford Motor Corporation and the United Auto Workers Union, posed the
dilemma with precision and clarity: "Is the agreement an exclusive state-
ment of rights and privileges [for the union] or does it subsume continua-
tion of existing conditions? ' 23 His suggested resolution of the dilemma is
less lucid. Shulman says that the arbitrator, when faced with an issue that
falls within the nether space, must give a "wise judgment."2 '' Although he
continues with some observations about the proper role of the arbitrator
and about advisable procedures to follow, he can only fall back on an
appeal to process: if the arbitrator is not making sufficiently wise judg-
ments, "the parties can readily dispense with him. ' 237 This begs the
question. 38
232. Id. at 121-22.
233. See, e.g., W. BAER, THE LABOR ARBITRATION GUIDE 65, 163-64 (1974).
234. See, e.g., Cox, Reflections, supra note 83, at 1498-99, 1503-07; Wallen, The Silent Contract
vs. Express Provisions: The Arbitration of Local Working Conditions, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND THE ARBITRATOR'S ROLE 117, 117-37 (M. Kahn ed. 1962).
235. Shulman, supra note 19, at 1011.
236. Id. at 1016.
237. Id.
238. Although Shulman argues that the benefit of an arbitral decision is that the parties have
selected the decisonmaker for themselves, Shulman, supra ilote 19, at 1016, his process-oriented solu-
tion to the retained rights problem is at odds with the pluralist rationale for arbitration. If arbitration
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Archibald Cox and John Dunlop try to give a more satisfactory answer.
They propose "that the parties to a comprehensive collective bargaining
agreement, in the absence of contrary evidence, are to be presumed to
have executed the agreement upon the understanding that major condi-
tions of employment not covered by the agreement would continue 'as they
were' unless changed by mutual agreement. 239 This is not exactly a mid-
dle ground: the company cannot make unilateral changes in "major condi-
tions," and the union cannot demand new concessions during the term of
the agreement. Because all conditions are open for "mutual agreement,"
this comes close to the pure joint sovereignty viewpoint. It means that an
arbitrator should take the status quo as part of the existing agreement.
Cox and Dunlop's status quo position sounds simple and sound until a
definition of the status quo is attempted. They admit this difficulty: "The
proposition that existing arrangements are carried forward except as
changed by the collective agreement, does not imply that all existing sub-
stantive conditions of employment should be regarded as frozen. 24 0 After
all, businesses constantly have to make adjustments in production meth-
ods, at least in areas such as job content and work loads. Thus the status
quo analysis needs to define those present conditions that are part of the
status quo and those that are not, and thus can be changed by unilateral
management action.
Cox and Dunlop suggest that the status quo should be considered to be:
(a) the modes of procedure followed in making decisions concerning
matters subject to continuous review, and
(b) the basic substantive terms and conditions of employment which
are changed only upon annual or biennial review. Where the collec-
tive bargaining agreement is silent, the pre-existing arrange-
ment-whether it is a procedure for making continuous changes or
an existing substantive term-should be deemed to be carried
forward.4 1
This formula could define a boundary if there were a way to decide what
is subject to "continuous review" and what is a "basic substantive term."
So long as management's procedures for unilateral changes are constant,
everything in Cox and Dunlop's first category would remain in the em-
ployer's unilateral control. So the test becomes what is subject to "continu-
ous review" and what are "basic substantive terms." Cox and Dunlop are
serves the function of a judiciary in the mini-democracy, then in theory, the arbitrator is to interpret
the language of the written agreement, not please the parties in a particular case. See pp. 1559, 1562
infra.
239. Cox & Dunlop, supra note 84, at 1118.
240. Id. at 1118.
241. Id. at 1118-19.
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quick to state that this test should not be taken as a "rigid rule.2142
Even as a flexible rule, however, it is hard to apply. What happens to
wash-up time, for example? It may have existed for ten years, but if man-
agement wants to change it, they could argue that it was subject to contin-
uous review insofar as they had the continuous right to abolish it. After
all, they would argue, it is not a basic substantive term of employment.
The matter seems to come down to what items management had the con-
tinuous right to review, and what is meant by "basic" in the phrase "basic
substantive term of employment." Different speakers, giving different em-
phases to the words, would reach different results. Thus we are back to
our original question: which employment conditions remain in exclusive
management control and which are brought within joint control by the
duty to bargain?
Arthur Goldberg, a labor lawyer and leading spokesman for industrial
pluralism, has a more developed point of view. He states that manage-
ment has the right to manage the business and to direct the work force.
These are two different rights, with two different consequences. Manag-
ing the business involves determining "the product, the machine to be
used, the manufacturing method, the price, the plant layout, the plant
organization, and innumerable other questions. These are reserved rights,
inherent rights, exclusive rights which are not diminished or modified by
collective bargaining .... -243 The other type of management right-the
right to direct the work force with regard to wages, hours, or working
conditions-is merely a "procedural right."
It is a recognition of the fact that somebody must be boss; somebody
has to run the plant. People can't be wandering around at loose
ends, each deciding what to do next. . . . To assure order, there is
a clear procedural line drawn: the company directs and the union
grieves when it objects.
244
Goldberg's argument suggests that the right to manage is in the realm
of unilateral management control and that the right to direct is in the
realm of joint control. It is unclear what happens, however, when the
manufacturing method, the plant organization, and other management
rights have an impact on wages and conditions of employment. The com-
pany may want to move to a new location, phase out a production line,
automate some jobs, or change a production quota. All of these steps have
serious impacts on wages, hours, and working conditions. What looks like
242. Id. at 1119.
243. Goldberg, supra note 231, at 123.
244. Id. at 120-21.
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managing to management may well look like directing to workers.
Goldberg recognizes that management's "exclusive right to manage"
can conflict with labor's right to have a say. He attempts a reconciliation:
[A]n effort to claim that the exclusive right of management to estab-
lish a new method of manufacture keeps the worker from objecting
effectively to the resulting working conditions not only confuses the
labor-management issues, but it makes more difficult unequivocal ac-
ceptance of the rights of management. We are entirely in agreement
that the company can establish the manufacturing methods, but, if
management attempts to use this right as the basis for diminishing
labor's rights, then there must inevitably develop hostility to the
whole concept of exclusive management rights. 4 '
This answer says to the arbitrator: "be flexible, avoid hostility, do the best
you can."
David Feller, in a more recent articulation of the ideology of industrial
pluralism,2" does not even try to argue that the collective agreement rep-
resents joint sovereignty. Feller states that the rules embodied in a collec-
tive agreement represent in part management's retained rights and in part
the "web of rules" necessary to govern relations between subordinates and
superiors in any large-scale, hierarchically organized, complex organiza-
tion.247 The rules that emerge are therefore primarily the result of the
nature of modern industrial enterprise.248 He notes that at one time unions
also tried, sometimes successfully, to impose their rules on the workplace,
but that such union rules could only be imposed unilaterally if secured by
a closed shop. Once the closed shop was banned by the Taft-Hartley
Act,249 however, the imposition of union work rules became impossible.250
Thus collective bargaining is union participation in what would otherwise
be unilateral management rulemaking,2 1 but the scope of the union's in-
put is limited from the start. 2 2 He states that rules in a collective agree-
ment that limit management action are an implicit "acceptance [by the
union] of the authoritarian nature of the employment relationship. '253 He
245. Id. at 123.
246. Feller, supra note 175, at 721.
247. Id. at 721. The concept of the "web of rules" as a necessary part of every industrial enter-
prise is derived from J. DUNLOP, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS 13 (1958).
248. Feller, supra note 175, at 722-23.
249. The closed shop was banned by both the explicit prohibition in section 8(a)(3) and by the
prohibition of the secondary boycott in section 8(b)(4) which was the mechanism for the enforcement
of the closed shop. Id. at 734.
250. Id. at 734-35.
251. Id. at 724.
252. Feller states this explicitly when he observes that under most collective bargaining agree-
ments, "management and union are not coordinate partners in administration." Id. at 770.
253. Id. at 737.
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concludes that because the collective bargaining agreement does not re-
present a regime of joint power, the problem of line drawing between
areas of sovereignty should not arise.
Of course, the problem does arise in practice. Feller recognizes this fac-
tual contradiction in his theory: "Disputes as to whether particular actions
fall within the area of joint control or within management's 'prerogatives'
arise when management action is challenged through the adjudicative ma-
chinery. '22 4 Feller, however, does not even attempt to state a position. In
fact, on the debate over the interpretation of an agreement's silences he
says, "I do not propose to enter that controversy here.
2 s5
Feller sidesteps the problem of retained rights by asserting that it is not
a problem. He does this by means of inconsistency and reification. His
analysis is inconsistent on the contribution of unions to the collective
agreement. Although the crux of his theory is that collective bargaining
represents the consent of the workers through their union to the work
rules and conditions, most of his analysis of the nature of rules in employ-
ment is designed to show that the union has no actual effect on those
rules.216 What rules there are exist as the product of management's needs
and of the needs of complex organizations as such. This explains why he
says it is not important to distinguish with precision the realm of unilat-
eral control from that of joint control.
25 7
He also reifies such concepts as "technical efficiency," and "large com-
plex organization," so that most of the rules he discusses are attributed to
impersonal, inevitable, transhistorical forces. He does not even consider
the possibility that there could be alternative concepts of efficiency, or al-
ternative, nonhierarchical means of organizing production.2 8 He uses the
254. Id. at 738-39.
255. Id. at 760.
256. See id. at 738.
257. Feller's analysis draws on functionalist sociology in that it attempts to derive proscriptions
for behavior from posited descriptions of innate functions. As with other functionalist arguments,
Feller's assumes its conclusions in the descriptive categories with which it begins. Another example of
industrial pluralist functionalism is found in the writings of Neil Chamberlain, labor economist and
long-time arbitrator. Chamberlain urges that there is a standard of "relevancy" by which issues can
be allocated to management prerogative or to joint sovereignty:
The fact of recognition of the union as bargaining agent carries with it the obligation by
management to seek agreement with the union on matters relevant to the union-management
relationship before taking action. But by no means does this interpretation carry with it the
corollary that the functions of management are thereby being shared.
Chamberlain, Discussion, in MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND THE ARBITRATION PROCESS 138, 145 (J.
McKelvey ed. 1956).
According to Chamberlain, this formulation "binds management to prior consultation and negotia-
tion with the union on a certain generally understood range of subject matter." Id. at 148. So much
for a clear boundary.
258. An expanding body of literature supports the proposition that alternative methods of
organizing production are both possible and possibly preferable to current "efficient" bureaucratic
forms. See, e.g., H. BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL 184-233 (1974); D. NOBLE,
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reified concepts to explain not only the content of the rules, but also their
interpretation. The rules are self-executing in that they follow naturally
and inevitably from the nature of modern industrial enterprise. Thus, he
can say, on the controversial subject of whether an arbitrator may infer
limitations on mangement not explicitly mentioned in the agreement, that
"[t]he very nature of the agreement and the complex organization which it
governs often require substantial implication, if only because of the impos-
sibility of setting out in words all of the understandings and practices
which the parties necessarily assume in executing it." '259 If the "very na-
ture" of complex organization, modern industry, hierarchical organiza-
tion, and the like dictated the answer to this question, it is puzzling why
the problem keeps reemerging. Perhaps Feller has side-stepped the prob-
lem of retained rights because his analysis is incapable of providing an
answer.
E. Finding Meaning in Incoherency
What conclusions can be drawn from this uniform descent into incoher-
ency by the leading industrial pluralists when they confront the problem
of retained management rights? Clearly each of them sees the problem,
but cannot resolve it. Their ideology not only provides them no guidance;
it renders them incapable of describing the real world.
The incoherence of the pluralists on this issue stems from a deep con-
tradiction in their view of the world. Under the theory of the workplace as
a mini-democracy, they cannot hold a pure belief in retained rights. Such
a position would destroy the illusion of democracy because it would quick-
ly become apparent that only a small number of situations that arise in
the workplace are governed by explicit contract language. The over-
whelming majority of plant-life issues would still be subject to unilateral
management control. The area of joint control would be a miniature is-
land of democracy in an otherwise autocratic ocean. Furthermore, the is-
land would always be in danger of being submerged altogether because
management's strategy at the bargaining table would be to keep as many
items as possible out of the contract. Collective bargaining would then lose
its appearance as a joint determination of wages and of conditions of em-
ployment. Instead, the bargaining process would look like the struggles in
the days of open warfare, with the union trying to "capture" particular
items in specific, unequivocal language and the management resisting.
The collective agreement would hold out little promise of benefit to man-
AMERICA BY DESIGN 322-24 (1977); Stone, The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry, in
LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION 27, 28 (R. Edwards, M. Reich, & D. Gordon eds. 1974).
259. Feller, supra note 175, at 748 (emphasis added).
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agement, so the duty to bargain would be evaded. The resulting agree-
ment would not appear to be a jointly determined law by which both sides
are governed. In other words, a pure belief in retained rights would de-
stroy the pluralist illusion.
Although the pluralists cannot adopt the theory of retained rights, they
also are unwilling to adopt the position of joint sovereignty, because there
is no way to draw a boundary with wages, hours, and conditions on one
side and the management of the business on the other. All decisions that
affect the business also affect the workforce. Decisions about plant loca-
tion, choice of technology, and the nature of the product may affect the
workforce more than any other decisions the company makes. In fact, the
decisions that the pluralists want to term exclusive management preroga-
tives may be the ones in which it is most important for the union to have a
say.
In order to avoid such an expansive definition of joint sovereignty, the
pluralists invoke two arguments. They either invoke principles of private
property by stating that the prerogatives of ownership give management
unilateral control over major investment policy decisions, or they invoke
some form of technological determinism to explain why it is in the very
nature of large organizations that such decisions inevitably must be made
by management. Neither of these arguments is compatible with joint
sovereignty.
Joint sovereignty, if it is to mean anything at all, must mean a redefini-
tion of the incidents of ownership, which entails both an attack on private
property and a rejection of technological determinism. It must involve a
relinquishment by management of what it has heretofore regarded as its
exclusive decisionmaking prerogatives, even in such "vital" areas as in-
vestment decisions. Giving unions a voice in matters like wages and hours
is of limited value if they have no say in matters that affect the competi-
tive position of the firm, for that is what ensures the firm's ability to pay
any wage at all. For the union to participate meaningfully in any matter
that concerns workers, it must address issues that lie at the core of en-
tre'preneurial control. A form of collective bargaining that gave unions an
equal voice in such matters would be true joint sovereignty. Such a form,
however, would deprive management of many of the incidents of private
ownership, a result that neither management nor the industrial pluralists
intended.6 0 Joint sovereignty must also acknowledge the possibility that
unions do influence the operation of the business, and thereby reject the
view that industrial conditions are the inevitable and necessary result of
large-scale organizations as such. Otherwise there would be no point in
260. Goldberg, supra note 231, at 127.
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permitting the union to have input into decisions-the decisions would be
predetermined.
21
V. The Premise of Neutral Adjudication
A second premise of the industrial pluralist ideology is that impartial
arbitration of breach of contract disputes is possible. This premise is im-
plicit in the metaphor of industrial life as a mini-democracy. The analogy
of an arbitrator to a judge subsumes the notion that a judge can decide a
case in an apolitical way, above the conflict of forces that went into mak-
ing the laws." 2
It may well be that it is even more important in an industrial setting
than in a judicial setting for the dispute-resolver to have a neutral meth-
odology for dispute resolution. This is because an arbitrator, unlike a
judge, is purely a creature of the parties' agreement. The "law" to be
applied to a dispute is the set of rules that the parties have negotiated.
There is no room for any outside considerations such as "public interest"
or "good faith," which a court might feel justified in imposing on litigants.
The arbitrator has no basis for bringing in any other rules than those
provided by the parties' own agreement.
2 63
Archibald Cox and John Dunlop have suggested the need for and pos-
sibility of neutral contract interpretation. In arguing that the section 8(d)
definition of bargaining does not require continuous bargaining over items
embodied in the written agreement,6 4 they state that there is a "funda-
mental distinction" between making and enforcing collective bargaining
agreements. 65 Continuous bargaining would undermine the very notion of
a written agreement: "To require either management or union to bargain
about a proposal to modify an existing contract would encourage either
party to seek release from any of its commitments that happened to be-
come onerous after the contract had been signed. 266 Cox and Dunlop add
that under such a rule "the obligations of contract for a fixed period
would have scarcely more effectiveness than those of a contract at will. '267
By casting a collective agreement as a bar to further negotiation, they state
that the process of interpreting the agreement is fundamentally different
261. As with David Feller's resort to tehcnological determinism, any explanation based on the
inherent nature of large organizations deprives the union of any role whatsoever in the formulation of
rules. See note 257 supra.
262. See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 256-59 (1977)
(discussing "[t]he desire to separate law and politics"); Kennedy, supra note 56, at 1770 (describing
individualist conception of judge as objective law-finder and law-applier).
263. Shulman, supra note 19, at 1009-12.
264. Cox & Dunlop, supra note 84, at 1112-14.
265. Id. at 1115.
266. Id. at 1113.
267. Id. at 1116.
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from the negotiation process itself.
Cox and Dunlop qualify the distinction between the interpretation of
the agreement and the negotiation process itself, however, as "a matter of
emphasis and degree." ' They say that "[since the purpose of a labor
agreement is to establish a general framework for a continuing human
relationship, many of its provisions are not self-effectuating. Others are
couched in general terms which do not supply a clear and unmistakable
answer to every problem."2 9 Subject to these limitations, they assert that
neutral contract interpretation is possible. They describe this interpreta-
tion as a process "of particularizing general principles established by em-
ployer and union when the agreement was negotiated. It is an 'adminis-
trative' or 'judicial' process, and the 'legislative' session to be held upon
the expiration of the contract is the only time at which the basic agree-
ment should be altered ....
In this conception, the arbitrator neutrally implements the will of the
parties by applying it to unforeseen or contested situations. Although he
resolves disputes by ruling for one side or the other, he always derives the
result from the collective agreement by a process of neutral interpretation
which yields a "correct" solution to the dispute.
A. The Arbitrator as Labor-Relations Physician
Although the pluralists insist on the possibility of neutral arbitration,
their description of the arbitrator's role and methodology appears strange.
Any normal picture of judicial neutrality is abandoned altogether. They
insist that arbitration is superior to a court for resolving day-to-day labor
disputes because the judicial method is too rigid and therefore inappropri-
ate in an industrial setting. 27 They posit a "common law of the shop
which implements and furnishes the context of agreement. 2 72 This com-
mon law differs from that applied by a judge: it is made up of the "prac-
tices, assumptions, understandings, and aspirations of the going industrial
concern "' 273 Justice Douglas suggested this in the Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co. opinion of the Steelworkers Trilogy,27' stating that an arbitra-
tor is usually chosen for his "knowledge of the common law of the shop
... . The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience
and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he
268. Id. at 1115.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1116.
271. See, e.g., Shulman, supra note 19, at 1019.
272. Cox, Reflections, supra note 83, at 1499.
273. Id. at 1500.
274. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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cannot be similarly informed. '25
This view of the arbitrator's task suggests that he does not simply con-
strue the language of the agreement. The arbitrator must also be a source
of special knowledge necessary to the decision, knowledge of the esoteric
world of the workplace.276 Furthermore, the arbitrator does not confine
himself to the bench. According to Shulman, an arbitrator should actively
participate in the hearings. "The arbitrator may have to take a more ac-
tive part in the investigation than does a trial court . . . . Interpretation
of the agreement requires, however, appreciation by the interpreter of rel-
evant facts; and the arbitrator must assure himself as well as he can that
he has them. '277 Shulman suggests that the arbitrator subpoena and ques-
tion witnesses himself, and in other ways conduct his own investigation.
This activism and the application of unwritten "common law of the
shop" principles, is not judicial lawmaking-arbitrator contract-making
-asserts Shulman, because the arbitrator is directly accountable to the
parties. If he violates the intentions expressed in the collective agreement,
they can dismiss him. The need to obtain the continuing consent of the
parties acts as a check on the arbitrator's discretion and insures that the
arbitrator impartially applies the agreement as modified by the common
law of the shop. Shulman explains that, although in any given case the
losing party will object to the award, an arbitrator knows that he has
acted neutrally if his opinions are accepted, "not resentfully, but cordially
and willingly.
'278
The Shulman version of the arbitrator's role goes even further to in-
clude direct intervention in cases in which the arbitrator "conscientiously
feels baffled." In such cases, Shulman suggests that the arbitrator use his
office and his influence-including the "gentle pressure of a threat of deci-
sion"-to encourage the two sides to agree voluntarily to a settlement.79
Shulman's view reflects an extreme position in the debate about the role
of arbitrators that took place in the 1950s and the 1960s. 280 The debate
crystallized around a number of specific questions: Should the arbitrator
depart from the written agreement? Should the arbitrator meet separately
with the parties in efforts to promote settlement? Is a permanent umpire
preferable to an ad hoc arbitrator? Positions on these issues tended to
cluster. In general, the pluralists favored Shulman's approach of the crea-
tive, free-wheeling, sometimes-mediator arbitrator. They also tended to
275. Id. at 582.
276. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 & n.2 (1960).
277. Shulman, supra note 19, at 1017-18.
278. Id. at 1019.
279. Id. at 1023.
280. See Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE
ARBITRATOR'S ROLE 8, 8-11 (M. Kahn ed. 1962).
1561
The Yale Law Journal
281favor permanent umpires.
The argument for a standing umpire complemented the Shulman
method of arbitration. By developing a long-term relationship with the
parties, a permanent arbitrator would be more sensitive to the assump-
tions and conditions that underlie their agreements. He would be better
informed of the common law of the shop. As Benjamin Aaron expressed
it: "The standing umpire is, in a sense, a partner in this relationship and,
as compared with the ad hoc arbitrator, he has much more freedom to
take into account the long-term interests of the parties in deciding discipli-
nary cases.1
282
The nonpluralists of the era took a different position on each of these
issues.2 Lon Fuller, for example, described the Shulman-style arbitrator
as a "labor relations physician." Such an arbitrator, he stated, thinks he
has a "roving commission to straighten things out. 28 4 He rejected Shul-
man's suggestion that arbitrators should meet separately with the two
sides to a dispute in order to mediate a settlement. 28' According to Fuller,
such meetings discredit the arbitration process by making awards appear
"rigged." Fuller also warned that such behavior leads to the temptation to
rig awards in fact. The appearance or fact of rigging, even if done with
good motives, undermines the entire institution of arbitration by eroding
its premise of neutrality and hence its legitimacy.2
Fuller's full venom was directed at "permanent umpire" arbitration
through which "departures from the judicial role tend to become cumula-
tive."287 Over time, the parties increasingly depend on this arbitrator-me-
diator to resolve all kinds of disputes; he becomes a "super-manager.
2 "*
As a result, "the moral force of the judicial role has been forfeited. It is no
281. For example, George Taylor, who had served both as the Chairman of the War Labor
Board and the Chairman of the Hoisery Industry Arbitration Board argued that arbitration must
necessarily involve attempts at mediation by the arbitrator. Taylor, Effectuating the Labor Contract
Through Arbitration, in THE PROFESSION OF LABOR ARBITRATION 20, 21-22 (J. McKelvey ed. 1957)
(Second Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators). Taylor was also one of the strong-
est advocates for impartial umpires rather than ad hoc arbitrators. See Taylor, The Voluntary Arbi-
tration of Labor Disputes, 49 MICH. L. REV. 787, 794 (1951).
282. Aaron, Some Procedural Problems in Arbitration, 10 VAND. L. REV. 733, 741 (1957).
283. See R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, & D. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 227, at 236; Braden, The
Function of the Arbitrator in Labor-Management Disputes, 4 ARB. J. 35, 37-40 (1949); Fuller, supra
note 280, at 9. Wayne Morse, a former member of the War Labor Board and labor arbitrator, was
adamant in his belief that arbitration is a judicial process, having nothing in common with mediation.
Morse, in his capacity as a United States Senator, opposed section 8(d) of the Act. He argued that the
duty to bargain should continue throughout the life of an agreement because "collective bargaining
does not end with the consummation of a contract." 93 CONG. REC. 6612 (1947), quoted in Cox &
Dunlop, supra note 84, at 1113.
284. See Fuller, supra note 280, at 9.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 26-27.
287. Id. at 46.
288. Id.
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longer available as a reserve for meeting an eventual crisis. Meanwhile,
the parties' capacity for unaided self-government may have suffered a se-
rious decline through disuse." '289
Fuller also dismissed Shulman's argument that the need to obtain the
parties' consent controls the arbitrator's discretion:
There is generally no real sense, for example, in which it can be said
that the workers in a particular factory have approved either a loose
or a strict interpretation of the arbitrator's role. In such a matter
only a few key figures, chiefly the arbitrator himself, have that sense




Fuller acknowledged that the Shulman model of the arbitrator as labor
relations physician is derived from the pluralists' view of the collective
agreement as both a constitution and a trade contract. Yet, he did not
explore the connection. Instead, he asserts: "[F]rom the curiously mixed
nature of the collective bargaining agreement there is derived (by a logic
that is certainly not obvious) the conclusion that it must be construed
freely.
1291
Fuller's observation is uncharacteristicaly understated. Not only is the
conclusion not obvious, but on its face, the creative, free-wheeling type of
arbitrator favored by Shulman contradicts the industiral pluralists' com-
mitment to voluntarism; the Shulman arbitrator is encouraged to do far
more than simply interpret the collective agreement. At the very least,
Shulman's methodology undermines the appearance, if not the fact, of
neutrality. Why then are the pluralists so insistent and so united in its
praise?
B. The Arbitrator as Plant Psychiatrist
The pluralists themselves suggest an answer. They state that the appar-
ent surface-level calm of industrial life may mask deep tensions that
threaten to explode.292 An individual grievance that appears slight may
spark a great upheaval in the shop. According to Shulman: "[T]he fre-
quent instances of stoppage of work in a department or a whole plant
because of a disciplinary penalty imposed on a single employee indicates
that what is involved is not merely the case of an individual but a group
dispute. 293 Similar observations have been made by other pluralists.9
289. Id. at 47.
290. Id. at 49, 50.
291. Id. at 10.
292. See pp. 1571-72 infra (discussing impact of human relations on industrial pluralism).
293. Shulman, supra note 19, at 1015-16.
294. In observing the strong emotions aroused by discharge cases, Freiden and Ulman state:
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This then is the special expertise of arbitrators which Douglas referred to
in the Steelworker Trilogy. It is an expertise that enables the arbitrator to
sense undercurrents of discontent beneath an individual grievance. Simi-
larly, the flexibility that the pluralists claim makes arbitration superior to
judicial resolution of these disputes is not only flexibility of procedure or
of remedies, but also flexibility of outcomes. The pluralists suggest that
arbitrators should tailor outcomes to alleviate tensions when underlying
conditions are about to explode.295 This may be why "the arbitration
hearing has been called the psychiatrist's couch of industrial relations." 296
This vision of the arbitrator's task assumes substantial, perhaps even
unrealistic skills, on the part of arbitrators. At first glance, it is possible
that a permanent umpire could sense underlying tensions and arbitrate so
as to alleviate them. But could a one-time, ad hoc arbitrator also perform
that function? Even the one-time arbitrator is not insulated fully from the
plant life and the parties' underlying attitudes. Advocates in an arbitral
hearing commonly intimate in their arguments the most acceptable form
of an adverse decision.9 7 Such subtle communication between the parties
and the arbitrator might allow an ad hoc arbitrator to distinguish poten-
tially explosive disputes that require "flexibility" from less volatile griev-
ances. A permanent umpire would still be superior to an ad hoc arbitra-
tor, however, because ongoing contact would allow the umpire a better
opportunity to hear underground grumblings. The pluralists therefore
prefer that form of arbitration. Furthermore, this interpretation explains
Shulman's insistence that an arbitrator step down from the bench and
play a mediating role when "the arbitrator is quite at sea with respect to
the consequences of his decision in the operation of the enterprise. 29'
"When these issues become a test of power, a single discharge may loom far larger than its impor-
tance to the operation of the plant or the overall stability of the union." Freiden & Ulman, supra note
67, at 357. Isadore Katz, labor lawyer and legal scholar, wrote similarly in 1947 that: "The sense of
injustice of aggrieved workers runs deeply to the very center of their being, and unless allayed quickly
will be converted into hate and hostility leading directly to the flaming labor dispute . . . ." Katz,
Minimizing Disputes Through the Adjustment of Grievances, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 249, 259
(1947). In a pamphlet promoting labor arbitration, the Department of Labor also stated that resent-
ment by individual employees who believe that they were treated unfairly had a tendency "to poison
the industrial blood stream." Settling Plant Grievances, BULL. No. 60 (1940) (U.S. Department of
Labor), cited in Freiden & Ulman, supra note 67, at 312.
295. Shulman, supra note 19, at 1023. See also H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PRO.
CESS 94 (1968) (arbitrators frequently decide cases on prudential grounds rather than on basis of
written agreement). This is not to suggest that all arbitrators adopt this view in practice. Many
arbitrators do in fact render reasoned, disinterested interpretations of the contract. It is to suggest,
rather, an inconsistency between the theory and the practice of arbitration on the part of its very
architects.
296. Myers, Concepts of Industrial Discipline, in MANGEMENT'S RESERVED RIGHTS AND THE
ARBITRATION PROCESS 70, 74 (J. McKelvey, ed. 1962).
297. Fuller, supra note 280, at 28.
298. Shulman, supra note 19, at 1023 (emphasis added); see Myers, supra note 296, at 74.
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C. A Reexamination of the Role of Arbitration
If the pluralists' arbitrator in practice does not even try to be a neutral
interpreter of the collective agreement, then a different view of the role of
arbitration in the shop emerges. No longer is arbitration a judicial process
of law application. It becomes an element in the existing conflicts between
management and the union.299 This is because all changes in plant condi-
tions affect the relative balance of power between management and labor.
In a situation of constant conflict, there is no possibility of neutral inter-
vention. The resolution of each dispute becomes part of the background
against which future disputes arise and are resolved. Arbitrators function
in this power contest as active intervenors in plant life in order to ensure
the smooth continuity of operations and the diffusion of tensions, so as to
help to preserve industrial order. But, as with any form of social order, it
is important to see who benefits from industrial orderliness, and at whose
expense it is achieved. It is in disorder that workers experience and exer-
cise their power in the production process. The entire history of the labor
movement is a history of workers creating "disorder"-strikes, disruptions
of production, picketing-in order to achieve unionization and to better
their working conditions. Like the law of gravity, the collective power of
workers is only evident when the everyday structures collapse. Only in the
midst of "disorder" do workers have the leverage to press for their de-
mands. Thus by intervening to preserve order, arbitrators are not only
nonneutral, they are acting consistently on the side of management.'
299. Ratner, supra note 155, at 261-62.
300. Various arbitration doctrines that have developed and that have received widespread accept-
ability further the bias toward a management-serving status quo. One such doctrine is the so-called
"obey now-grieve later" rule, first announced by Harry Shulman in Ford Motor Co., Spring &
Upset Bldg., 3 Lab. Arb. Rep. 779, 780 (1944); see p. 1551 supra. Many subsequent decisions ap-
plied this rule. See, e.g., C. Schmidt Co. v. Allied Indus. Workers Local 157, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. 90,
93 (1976) (McIntosh, Arb.) (obey now-grieve later applied to improper work assignment); Pacific
Southwest Airlines v. Southwest Ind. Stewardesses Ass'n, 62 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1189, 1195 (1974) (Gen-
tile, Arb.) (obey now-grieve later rule applied to illegal work assignment); Chrysler Corp. v. UAW,
62 Lab. Arb. Rep. 161, 165 (1974) (Alexander, Arb.) (obey now-grieve later rule applied to posting
sign). Other examples of nonneutral arbitral doctrines are the doctrine that in a discipline case the
credibility of the grievant should be discounted because the grievant has a motive to lie. See, e.g., Ford
Motor Co. v. UAW, I AM. LAB. ARB. AWARDS (P-H) 67,274, at 67,619-20 (1975) (Shulman, Arb.)
(in credibility dispute, it is general proposition that grievant has incentive to lie while management
has no such incentive absent showing of ill-will); see F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURi, HOW ARBITRATION
WORKS 188 (1960) (citing cases). Another doctrine holds that management has a right to make unilat-
eral rules, as long as they are "reasonable," see, e.g., Hydril Co. v. United Steelworkers Local 580, 61
Lab. Arb. Rep. 464, 467 (1973) (Carraway, Arb.) (management is justified in unilaterally instituting
"no-fault" progressive discipline for absences without specific rulemaking authority in contract);
Mechanical Hardline Sys., Inc., 26 Lab. Arb. Rep. 401, 403 (1956) (Keller, Arb.) (employer may
make reasonable rules as long as contract does not prohibit), or justified by economic efficiency argu-
ments, see, e.g., Caproco, Inc. v. Upholsterers' Int'l Local 25, 56 Lab. Arb. Rep. 65, 66 (1971)
(Larkin, Arb.) (company may install closed circuit television to surveil employees in order to operate
efficiently). Some arbitrators also espouse a doctrine that an employer's showing of business justifica-
tion may override explicit contract language. See, e.g., Fruehauf Corp., Decatur Plant v. Aluminum
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VI. The Two Facets of Industrial Pluralism
In the last two sections, the central premises of industrial pluralism
were examined and found to be untenable. Management and labor do not
resemble political parties in a legislature that jointly determine the rules
of the workplace; doctrines such as retained rights and the mandatory-
permissive bargaining distinction limit the union's ability to contribute
equally to the most crucial aspects of plant life. Neutral adjudication of
disputes by an impartial arbitrator is also an untenable premise. The no-
tion that an arbitrator can interpret and enforce shop rules in a neutral
manner, above the very power struggles that gave rise to the rules in the
first place, was implausible even to the pluralists themselves. They see the
role of arbitrators as guarantors of the smooth continuity of plant opera-
tions. Their interventionist methodology makes grievance resolution a con-
tinuation of the initial struggle that went into the negotiation of the agree-
ment in the first place.
With the collapse of definable boundaries for joint sovereignty and the
erosion of the distinction between contract making and contract enforce-
ment, the industrial pluralist metaphor of the plant as a mini-democracy
ceases to have any descriptive validity and becomes a mere illusion. Yet it
is an illusion that continues to prevail in the case law 01 and in the indus-
trial relations literature. 02 How then can we account for the persistence of
this illusion?
The illusion of industrial pluralism-the myth of the mini-democ-
racy-persists because it serves a function in industrial relations, or
rather, two mutually reinforcing functions. First, industrial pluralism im-
plements the ideas of the human relations school of industrial sociology, a
school of thought that is self-consciously concerned with the manipulation
of workers in order to increase productivity. Second, the pluralist myth
creates an illusion of consent by workers to industrial conditions that legit-
imates the conditions that result. These two facets of industrial plural-
ism-manipulation and legitimation-together lend vitality to the theory
despite its internal theoretical incoherency.
A. The Human Relations School
The human relations school of industrial sociology developed at the
same time as did the theory of industrial pluralism. It grew out of experi-
Workers Int'l Local 203, 52 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1051, 1057 (1969) (Jenkins, Arb.) (contract clause gov-
erning reassignments and overtime can be overridden by employer's business "necessity").
301. See note 192 supra.
302. See, e.g., Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 274-75 (1980) (arbitration is part of process by which labor participates in
making rules of workplace).
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ments performed at Western Electric's Hawthorne Works throughout the
1930s and 1940s by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the
Harvard Business School, and the National Research Council. 303 The ex-
periments began as a study of the relationship between lighting conditions
and work efficiency. The results showed that the productivity of both the
experimental group who had good lighting and that of the control group
whose lighting conditions were unchanged increased during the course of
observation. In trying to explain this surprising result, the experimenters
altered other conditions in the workplace, such as temperature and hu-
midity. They also changed the method of wage payments, gave more rest
periods, and made other alterations in the work rules. The experimenters
found that whatever change they made led to increased productivity in
both the experimental group and the control group.0 4
To explain these findings, they brought in sociologists, psychologists,
and anthropologists °.30 This multi-discipline team developed a hypothesis
that the increased productivity of workers involved in the experiments was
caused by the very fact that they were being studied. Because they were
asked for comments and criticisms of the tests, workers, in the course of
the experiments, became united as a group and developed group loyalty to
the company, thus increasing their productivity.
30 6
This hypothesis led to a general theory of industrial relations which
said that factory life has a complex internal social organization of cliques
and status hierarchies. Group pressure prevents "deviant" behavior. "De-
viance," however, is defined by the group, and it often means "rate bust-
ing"; that is, the enforcement by group pressure of low production stan-
dards and restricted output. Thus, the theory concluded that informal
work groups, not management, regulated productivity.
307
In the 1920s and 1930s, as unions lost strength due to the employers'
anti-union offensive and to the Depression, informal work groups increas-
ingly limited output in order to spread the work and keep members on the
job.308 By the 1930s, American businessmen considered restriction of out-
303. See generally F. ROETHLISBERGER & W. DICKSON, MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER
(1939) (history and analysis of results of Hawthorne experiments); N. WHITEHEAD, THE INDUSTRIAL
WORKER (1938) (statistical analysis of raw data from Hawthorne experiments). For a general over-
view of the development and the impact of the human relations school, see L. BARITZ, SERVANTS OF
POWER 76-116 (1960).
304. See, e.g., F. ROETHLISBERGER & W. DICKSON, supra note 303, at 127, 160 (neither varia-
tions in rest conditions nor wages account for productivity changes).
305. Among those brought in were Elton Mayo, William Werner, and Theodore Roethlissinger.
See generally L. BARITZ, supra note 303, at 87-116.
306. See F. ROETHLISBERGER & W. DICKSON, supra note 303, at 58-59, 189-90.
307. Id. at 523-38 (explaining productivity variance in wiring experiment).
308. See S. MATHEWSON, RESTRICTION OF OUTPUT AMONGST UNORGANIZED WORKERS 86-102
(1934) (fear of unemployment was major cause of restriction of output).
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put a major problem." 9 Therefore, as the Hawthorne Experiment contin-
ued into the 1930s, it focused increasingly on ways to prevent such restric-
tions. With the new theory of in-plant social life, the experimenters
sought to induce employee work groups to adopt the goals of management,
so that collective pressure would increase rather than decrease
production. 10
To achieve this goal, the experimenters conducted extensive worker in-
terviews throughout the plant. They wanted to find out how workers per-
ceived their jobs. The interviews led to great improvement in morale and
productivity, and led experimenters to conclude that giving workers a
chance to talk about their feelings also caused them to identify with the
company. 1 Thus, a systematic "personnel counseling" program was set
up in 1936 to encourage workers to articulate freely their feelings about
their job and about the company. 12 Well-liked workers were trained and
were placed back in their former departments to counsel, to listen to com-
plaints, and to watch for signs of unrest. Individual counseling was seen
as a safety valve by which anti-company group pressure could be diverted
and diluted." 3 The counseling program, called "control by listening," was
designed to make the workers feel that management "was interested in
their opinions.31 4 Experimenters hoped that the program would create
identification with the company and infuse the work groups with manage-
ment values. At the Hawthorne Works the individual counseling program
was considered a big success; it was thought to be responsible for keeping
the company nonunion throughout the thirties and forties.
315
A striking similarity exists between the job-counseling program set up
in the Hawthorne Works and the typical union grievance procedure. The
job counselor resembles the union shop steward, a similarity that did not
escape the attention of industrial sociologists and industrial pluralists.
3t'
The original Hawthorne experimenters were explicitly concerned with the
prevention of unionization, and directed their suggestions to that goal.3
7
309. See L. BARITZ, supra note 303, at 99 (regulation of output was major problem for manage-
ment in 1930s); S. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management 164-200 (1941) (Brookings
Institute) (detailing various forms of restriction of output used in 1930s).
310. See F. ROETHLISBERGER, MANAGEMENT AND MORALE 22-26 (1942) (Hawthorne analysis of
worker motivation provided opportunity to combat output restriction by understanding and environ-
mental change).
311. See F. ROETHLISBERGER & W. DICKSON, supra note 303, at 226-229.
312. Id. at 593-601.
313. Id. at 601-03.
314. F. ROETHLISBERGER, supra note 310, at 106-08.
315. See L. BARITZ, supra note 303, at 113-66.
316. W. WHYTE, PATTERN FOR INDUSTRIAL PEACE 171-72, 185-86, 188-97 (1951) (management,
by cooperating with union, can gain vital assistance in such areas as productivity and absenteeism).
317. B. SELEKMEN, LABOR RELATIONS AND HUMAN RELATIONS at v-ix (1947); L. BERITZ, supra
note 303, at 113-66.
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As unions became a fact of life, however, the human relations disciples
and the advocates of collective bargaining used the Hawthorne theories to
reconcile their differences.
B. Human Relations and Unions
Benjamin Selekman of the Harvard Business School was one of the first
to do so. In his book, Labor Relations and Human Relations, published in
1947, Selekman attempted to show that the upsurge of unionism and col-
lective bargaining in the decade following the passage of the Wagner Act
could end the post-war wave of industrial strife .3 " Like the pluralists, he
invoked the goal of "free collective bargaining" and decried any suggestion
that legislative regulation be used to set up "compulsory arbitration or
'supermachinery' for disposition of labor disputes." '319 Instead, he argued
that collective bargaining itself could "evolve as an appropriate form of
human relations in industry. ' 320 His book is a manual that teaches man-
agement to react to a union in a way that minimizes tensions and estab-
lishes joint cooperative arrangements.
The crux of Selekman's suggestions involves the handling of shop griev-
ances. He said: "Grievances are inextricably interwoven not only with
objective shop conditions but with the whole texture of subjective shop
relationships. 32 1 Stressing the importance of shop communication and
management sensitivity to underlying worker discontent, he asserted that:
What the administrator needs, therefore, is some means by which he
can constantly gauge the smoothness of shop relationships. And it is
precisely from this need that the grievance takes on cardinal signifi-
cance. Each grievance and its adjustment offers such a gauge, such a
continuing index of the effectiveness of ongoing relations. 22
Selekman suggested that management abandon the legalistic approach
of confining grievances strictly to questions of contract interpretation.
323
Under such an approach, many workers' complaints go unheeded and ap-
pear in other forms. This is undesirable because the underlying sense of
injustice is never dealt with by management:
When strong emotions are denied an outlet for expression in their
own terms, they find ways of utilizing some other outlet for expres-
318. B. SELEKMAN, supra note 317, at 3.
319. Id. at 5.
320. Id. at 11.
321. Id. at 77.
322. Id. at 78.
323. Id. at 78-86.
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sion in approved or disguised terms . . . .No complaint, to put it
bluntly, will ever be completely or effectively shut off or dismissed. It
may be driven underground. . . only to reappear. . . in shop un-
rest, walkouts, slowdowns, turnover, absenteeism, lack of discipline,
clique hostility, and so on." 4
To avoid this parade of horribles, Selekman suggested that every gripe
should be reviewable under the grievance procedure. 2 Under this ap-
proach, the grievance procedure would provide "an outlet for articulating
and draining off dissatisfactions as well as cooperative techniques for set-
tling and probing conflicts over interpretation of the contract."' 26
Human relations theorists perceived that grievance procedures and ar-
bitration have the potential to create an illusion of fairness in the settle-
ment of day-to-day disputes, which could obtain worker acquiesence to a
broad range of industrial conditions. 27 One prophetic commentator noted,
as early as 1939, before all the results of the Hawthorne experiments
were in, that:
[a]ny personnel executive will tell you that the most important factor
in maintaining a satisfactory morale among employees is to prevent
the individual employee from feeling that an injustice has been done
him . . .From the management's viewpoint the problem of griev-
ances is or should be Number One on its industrial relations
program.
28
The need for management to adopt a broad definition of "grievances"
in order to undermine informal work groups and to gain control of work-
ers has been a continuing theme in industrial relations literature since the
Hawthorne experiments . 9 For example, Isadora Katz applied the idea
directly to industrial pluralism in her article, Minimizing Disputes
324. Id. at 85-86.
325. Id. at 90.
326. Id. at 237; see Selekman, Reducing Friction in Employer-Employee Relationships, 12 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 232, 242 (1947).
327. See pp. 1573-74 infra. Joseph Scanlon of M.I.T., another first-generation disciple of the
Hawthorne experimenters, published a study with Douglas McGregor in 1948 on the usefulness of
the human relations approach in a unionized firm, based on a case study of the Dewey and Almy
Chemical Company. They too put forward the idea that the grievance procedure could be used as a
safety valve for employee discontent. D. MCGREGOR & J. SCANLON, THE DEWEY AND ALMY CHEMI-
CAL COMPANY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL WORKERS UNION (1948) (National Planning
Association, Washington, D.C.).
328. Pipin, The Enforcement of Rights Under Collective Bargaining Agreements, 6 U. CHI. L.
REV. 651, 651 (1939).
329. Those who advocate an expansive definition of the grievance because of its safety valve func-
tion do not always advocate the same expansive scope for arbitration. For example, a relatively recent
textbook in personnel relations theory states: "This all inclusive approach to grievances can be applied
at all steps of the [grievance] procedure save the last one-arbitration." D. BEACH, PERSONNEL: THE
MANAGEMENT OF PEOPLE AT WORK 592 (1965).
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through the Adjustment of Grievances-3
Grievances are complex reactions by workers to the interplay of psy-
chological, social, and economic forces. A proper grievance procedure
will be so designed that it will carry all grievances. Yet, in the early
stages of the collective relation, management's bargainers tend to be
concerned with preventing the adjustment of all but a restricted class
of grievances. The grievances they would consider are only those
which involve the interpretation and application of the terms of the
agreement. This limitation misses the entire point of the grievance
procedure and its office in the collective relation. The error derives
from failure to appreciate the multi-faced nature of the collectively
bargained agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement is at once a business compact,
a code of relations and a treaty of peace. . . . As a code of relations
it seeks to create a system of government through the processes of
which grievances are resolved, understanding achieved, a line of
communication opened between management and employees and a
self-disciplining labor force secured. 31
C. Human Relations and the Law
The human relations approach to grievances was adopted by Archibald
Cox, 332 in a passage which was quoted in the Steelworkers Trilogy.33 Cox
wrote:
Frivolous cases are often taken, and are expected to be taken, to ar-
bitration. What one man considers frivolous another may find meri-
torious, and it is common knowledge in industrial relations circles
that grievance arbitration often serves as a safety valve for trouble-
some complaints. Under these circumstances it seems proper to arbi-
trate every claim, meritorious or frivolous, which the complainant
bases upon the contract. The objection that equity will not order a
party to do a useless act is outweighed by the cathartic value of arbi-
trating even frivolous grievances and by the dangers of excessive ju-
dicial intervention.
334
In the American Manufacturing Co.3 11 opinion, Justice Douglas used this
passage as authority both for the proposition that any doubts about arbi-
330. 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 249 (1947).
331. Id. at 257. See also B. CRANE & R. HOFFMAN, SUCCESSFUL HANDLING OF LABOR GRIEV-
ANCES 16-18 (1965) (need for broad definition of grievances).
332. Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 247
(1958).
333. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 n.6 (1959).
334. Cox, supra note 332, at 261.
335. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1959).
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trability should be decided in favor of arbitration, 36 and for the notion
that the courts are not always sensitive to the "real" issues at stake and
thus are not the appropriate body to hear the merits of a grievance.
37
Douglas stated: "Arbitration is a stabilizing influence only as it serves as a
vehicle for handling every and all disputes that arise under the agreement
... . The processing of even frivolous claims have therapeutic values of
which those who are not a part of the plant environment may be quite
unaware." 38 Although Douglas limited arbitration to disputes that arise
under the agreement, his language echoed that of the human relations
school. Furthermore, the presumption of arbitrability can be seen as his
attempt to follow the advice of the Hawthorne experimenters and
Selekman by expanding as far as possible the scope of arbitration.
Other prominent industrial pluralists have also drawn explicitly on the
human relations theories to justify collective bargaining and arbitration.
For example, George Taylor, former Chirman of the War Labor Board,
stated that restriction of output was "deeply entrenched and well-nigh
universally practiced among virtually all employee groups, ' 3"9 as a re-
sponse to "job insecurity and. . . what were appraised as unfair terms of
employment. 340 The antidote, he told them, is collective bargaining. "The
direct representation of employees by a union at least permits a facing up
to and a direct dealing with those forces upon which the employee contri-
bution to production is so dependent. '"3 41
The intricate connection between industrial pluralism and the human
relations school also explains why arbitrators abandon the neutrality of
the judicial role to become plant psychiatrists. Arbitrators cite subterra-
nean shop tensions and the potentially explosive nature of minor disputes
as justification for their interventionist methodology. These are insights
drawn from the human relations school. By attending to such invisible
and submerged tensions, arbitrators put human relations theory into prac-
tice-they diffuse the build-up of collective tensions by addressing
problems in an individuated manner. The goal of this psychiatric model of
arbitration is the same as the job counseling program at the Hawthorne
Works: it is to break up the cohesiveness of the informal work group and
to counteract its power over production.
Even the everyday language of collective bargaining has been
"Hawthornized." For a "grievance," strictly defined, is an employer
336. Id. at 567.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 567-68.
339. Taylor, Collective Bargaining, in AUTOMATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 84, 92-93 (1.




Vol. 90: 1509, 1981
Industrial Pluralism
breach of a collective bargaining agreement. By terming it a grievance that
requires adjustment, rather than a breach of contract that requires a rem-
edy, the industrial pluralists have shifted the focus away from the objec-
tive rights and duties of employers and employees under their agreements
to a subjective inquiry into the employee's state of mind . 42 By shifting the
focus, the concern becomes how to alleviate the discontent rather than how
to correct the infraction.
The goal of defining grievances as subjective, individual concerns is to
exact greater productivity from workers. By employing human relations
theories, the industrial pluralists attempt not to satisfy workers' existing
desires and motivations, but to alter their motivations through changes in
the group structure. Work discipline, efficiency, and increased output are
the stated objectives of the human relations school.
D. The Presumption of Consent
Industrial pluralism not only embodies and implements the manipula-
tive strategies of the human relations school; it also provides a rationale to
justify the exercise of private power in the workplace, a problem which
has long been troublesome for democratic theorists.3 The rhetoric of
mini-democracy suggests that the workplace is not an enclave of private
power and domination in an otherwise free and democratic society.
Rather, it suggests that the workplace, too, is subject to the same demo-
cratic processes that prevail in the public life of our society. As in the
larger democracy, the conditions of the workplace are said to represent the
consent of the governed.
According to industrial pluralist theory, consent can be preserved be-
cause the collective bargaining agreement consists of jointly made rules by
which labor and management order the workplace. As such it is said to
reflect their joint wills. The democratic nature of collective bargaining is a
function of the bargaining process itself, which is said to involve the joint
input of both sides.144 As one pluralist said, "[ilt should be made clear that
it is joint authorship of the rules, rather than the procedures and sanctions
available for their interpretation, application and enforcement, that char-
342. Cf Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 660-64 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting)
(term "grievance" misleadingly applied to employee's contract claim for wages due).
343. See R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE 482-83 (1953)
("Management cannot logically justify its control [over investment policies, labor relations, and other
matters] except by showing that it is an agent of the society; yet if it is an agent of the society,
management can scarcely justify its untrammeled discretion over decisions of such high value to the
rest of society. . . .[O]nce the question of legitimacy is raised, it is difficult to justify the control of
any particular minority organization over managerial decisions of giant corporations.").
344. See C. GOLDEN & H. RUTTENBURG, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 43
(1942).
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acterizes collective bargaining. ' 45
The stress on joint rule determination slides easily into an implicit as-
sumption of self-determination by labor; that is, by helping to frame the
rules, the union has "made its own bed." Although the process of negotia-
tion necessarily entails some compromise, the resultant rules that displease
the union are the bitter inextricably bound up with the sweet. Thus, the
theory says, by participating in the bargaining process, the union consents
to both.
For industrial pluralists, this theory distinguishes a collective bargain-
ing agreement from an ordinary contract between two parties. If a collec-
tive bargaining agreement were seen as a conventional contract, the terms
it contained would be seen as the product of the relative power each side
had when it entered into the bargain; each side would be said to have
obtained the best deal it could under the circumstances. Under industrial
pluralism, however, the collective bargaining agreement is termed a sys-
tem of government. The notion of government by consent of the governed
implies that each side has accepted not only the particular terms of the
agreement but also the entire network of procedures that surrounds the
creation of the agreement, its enforcement, and its renegotiation. The par-
ticular rules that are generated by these processes are thought to express
both sides' participation and both sides' consent to every aspect of the
labor-management relationship. 46 The entire panoply of workplace regu-
lations and decisions-disciplinary rules, methods and pace of production,
hiring policies, and product quality-is implicitly within the union's con-
sent. Thus virtually all management decisions are legitimated by the
theory. David Feller, in his recent restatement of industrial pluralism, ex-
plained and extolled this result:
Collective bargaining can serve many useful functions for manage-
ment in connection with the formulation and administration of these
rules. First, it establishes a mechanism by which employee consent to
those rules can be obtained. That consent not only extends to those
rules established in the collective agreement but also to rules estab-
lished by management in areas not covered by the agreement to the
extent that the unions, by not insisting upon participating in the for-
mulation of those rules, can be said to have at least implicitly con-
sented to management's authority to impose them1
47
Is this expansive interpretation of consent merely a reductio ad ab-
345. Flanders, The Nature of Collective Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 11, 20 (A.
Flanders ed. 1969) (emphasis added).
346. Feller, supra note 80, at 100-06.
347. Feller, supra note 175, at 764 (emphasis added).
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surdum of the theory? Apparently not. Courts have seized upon the
industrial pluralist metaphor in order to hold unions jointly liable with
employers for unlawful employment practices over which they have no
control. For example, the trend in the decisional law under Title VII is to
hold a union jointly liable for company-initiated acts of discrimination
solely on the ground that the union is a party to the collective bargaining
agreement."' This is true even in cases in which the acts found to be
discriminatory involved areas wholly within management's unilateral con-
trol, such as hiring policies and job classification schemes,3 ' and even
choice of business location. 5'
The rhetoric of industrial pluralism also has the potential to encourage
workers to react to unfavorable conditions by apportioning the blame be-
tween the union and their employer, thereby sparing the employer the full
brunt of their dissatisfaction. John Dunlop and Benjamin Selekman have
urged businessmen to exploit this possibility by embracing collective bar-
gaining. Referring in particular to decisions that involved automation and
the displacement of employees-decisions that are inevitably unpopular
and provoke substantial resistance-they observed: "A strange thing be-
gins to happen under the new power setup. It becomes evident that re-
sponsibility for unpleasant consequences can be shared."" 1 Yet Dunlop
and Selekman advocated not the actual sharing of decisionmaking power
about such issues-issues that are not mandatory subjects of bargaining
and thus not within the realm of joint sovereignty; rather, they advocated
the spillover benefits achieved from the illusion of consent under the in-
dustrial pluralist version of collective bargaining.
It is impossible to know how deeply the illusion of consent affects indi-
vidual worker attitudes toward their employers and their unions. Accord-
ing to Summer Schlicter, during the 1940s and 1950s, the "growth in the
use of arbitration went hand-in-hand with the solution of wildcat strike
348. See, e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1381 (5th Cir. 1974);
Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252, 283 (N.D. Ind. 1977). See generally Note, Union
Liability for Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REV. 702, 703-05 (1980) (discussing cases in
which unions held liable for their role in negotiating and signing collective bargaining agreements that
contained discriminatory provisions).
349. See, e.g., Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252, 260-61 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Hairston
v. McLean Trucking Co., 62 F.R.D. 642, 675 (M.D. Cal. 1972).
350. See Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys. Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Union liability under Title VII for employer discrimination has been found not only when the
union acquiesced in the company's discriminatory actions, but also when the union actively opposed it.
See Sabala v. Western Gilette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251, 1263 (5th Cir. 1975); Freeman v. Motor Convoy,
Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (dicta). But see Terrell v. United States Pipe &
Founding Co., 644 F.2d 1112, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1981) (union, which actively opposed discriminatory
seniority system, is not liable under Title VII).
351. Healy, Fuller, Lindberg, Dunlop, & Selekman, Labor Relations: Union Power and Team-
work in American Industry, in GETrING THINGS DONE IN BUSINESS 76, 95 (E. Bursk ed. 1953).
1575
The Yale Law Journal
problems. 35 2 Similarly, a study by the Labor Study Group of the Com-
mittee for Economic Development concluded, in 1961, that: "The gains
from this system are especially noteworthy because of their effect on the
recognition and dignity of the individual worker . . . .Wildcat strikes
and other disorderly means of protest have been curtailed and an effective
work discipline generally established."3 3 Such observations indicate that
the manipulation and legitimation aspects of industrial pluralism have
been effective pacifiers of collective class tensions.35 4
There is, however, an antinomy in the hidden agenda of industrial plu-
ralism, a contradiction between its manipulation and legitmation facets.
Industrial pluralism, like other forms of pluralism, posits the group as the
basic unit of social life and consent as a group phenomenon. It is the
collective consent to the governing structures, which in pluralist theory is
said to be the basis for their legitimacy. Likewise, in industrial pluralism
it is no problem for the theory that particular individuals may object to
particular aspects of the terms and conditions of work, because the theory
is premised on group consent. JI. Case Co. v. NLRB355 firmly embedded
this notion in the law by holding that the individual is not free to negoti-
ate contracts with his employer that differ from the collectively bargained
agreement.
356
Although collective consent is presumed, however, industrial pluralism
secures this consent by attempting to individuate grievances and to destroy
the group. The human relations writers are straightforward in their intent
to undermine group cohesion and loyalty by means of personnel counsel-
ling programs. As the Hawthorne Works experiments proved, individual
airing of grievances undermines the strength of work groups. This applies
equally in union shops, so that the pluralist premise of group consent
means, in practice, a fragmentation process aimed at destroying the group.
Individual grievances are not clustered and dealt with collectively. They
are not shared together and presented to management collectively in a way
352. S. SCHLICTER, J. HEALY, & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
MANAGEMENT 746 (1960).
353. Independent Study Group of the Committee of Economic Development, The Public Interest
in National Labor Policy 32 (1961), cited in A. COX, D. BOK, & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 571 (8th
ed. 1977).
354. See Feller, supra note 175, at 765 ("[Tlhe process of collective bargaining ... can serve to
channel the natural desire of employees to exercise strategies of independence into acceptable forms
and to legitimize the results. . . .") See also Freiden & Ulman, supra note 67, at 312; Katz, supra
note 294, at 250-51.
355. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
356. Id. at 338; see, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 656 (1964) (individual
may not circumvent grievance procedure and sue in court for severance pay due under collective
bargaining agreement); .U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 352 (1971) (employee
bound by provisions of collective bargaining agreement that governs procedures by which contract
rights are enforced).
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that maximizes the strength of the workers. Therefore, collective bargain-
ing undermines collective action not only by the collective agreement's im-
plied or real no-strike clause and the court's presumption of arbitrability,
but also by the grievance and arbitration process itself.
This antinomy between the theory and the practice of industrial plural-
ism means that the viability of the theory as a way to legitimize the exer-
cise of private power in industrial life is negated by the application of the
theory itself. Indeed, when the practice of human relations successfully
manipulates and channels employee discontent in the way that it aspires
to do, its claim to achieve industrial democracy based on group consent
becomes altogether specious. The more successful the theory is as a tool of
manipulation, the less tenable it is as a mode of legitimation.
VII. The Locus of Struggle
So far it has been argued that the premises of industrial pluralism do
not correspond to the reality of the industrial world. At bottom, the theory
of industrial pluralism rests upon an assertion of equal power or poten-
tially equal power between management and labor. Only if this assertion
is true can the "legislative process" of collective bargaining be said to pro-
duce industrial democracy. Although the theorists of industrial pluralism
do not clearly differentiate between the assertions of equal power and the
assertions of merely potential equal power, this distinction is relevant.
Thus far, the assertion of equal power has been examined and found to be
false. Some pluralists, however, could maintain that the relative power of
management and labor will gradually become equalized through the very
process of collective bargaining.?17 This version of industrial pluralism
would state that, by assuming an equality between management and la-
bor, true equality is created; that is, that the pluralist interpretation of the
NLRA sets in motion a process that, over time, will create joint sover-
eignty, neutral adjudication, and government by the consent of the gov-
erned-true industrial democracy. 58
357. See S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY, & E. LIVERNASH, supra note 352, at 93 (differences in power
between management and labor diminishes in significance under collective bargaining); Barlin, Man-
agement Personnel Philosophy and Activities in a Collective Bargaining Era, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 314, 334 (1953)
(collective bargaining leads to joint administration in which relative power of labor and management
becomes unimportant).
358. See, e.g., S. SLICHTER, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 129 (1947) (process of
negotiation, in theory, creates mutual understanding which forms basis of increasingly improved rela-
tions between management and labor); W. WHYTE, INDUSTRY AND SOCIETY 174 (1946) (relations
between management and labor become more harmonious as they engage in collective bargaining);
Chamberlain & Kuhn, Conjunctive and Cooperative Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE BARGMNING 317,
318, 324 (A. Flanders ed. 1969) (collective bargaining builds trust and demonstrates to labor and
management that they have mutual interests that can be furthered by collective bargaining).
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This latter, teleological version of industrial pluralism is implicit when
some pluralists speak of the expanding realm of collective bargaining that
will occur through an expansion of the topics of bargaining. 5 In the
1950s, the pluralists frequently pointed to the emergence of bargaining
over fringe benefits as proof of the expanding realm. The Coal Mine
Health and Welfare Fund and the United Auto Workers' innovations in
pensions were given as examples. 6 In the 1960s, these pluralists also
spoke hopefully about the possibility of expanding the realm of bargaining
further to deal jointly with the problem of technological change. 61 By
expanding the topics of bargaining, it was argued that more issues, previ-
ously within management's unilateral control, would become subject to
joint control?
62
359. N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 106-07 (2d ed. 1965) (no limit to
areas in which unions will want input); THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, PARTNERS IN PRODUC-
TION 103-04 (1949) (assisted by 0. Nichols) (role of unions expanding into areas of productivity,
discipline, fringe benefits, work scheduling); Barton, Major Trends in American Trade Union De-
velopment, 1933-1955, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL RE-
LATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 38, 39 (1955) (topics of collective bargaining have constantly broad-
ened and trend will continue); Dolnick, Major Collective Bargaining Trends 1933-1955, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCI.
ATION 31, 37 (1955) (increase in topics of bargaining will continue indefinitely).
360. Sec Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089, 1113 (D.D.C. 1971), afl'd, 498 F.2d 789 (2d
Cir. 1974) ("pioneer role" of United Mineworkers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of
1950); Lesser, Problems in Pension Contributions and Benefits, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIFTHTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 86, 86
(1962) (UAW collectively bargained pension agreement in 1949 Ford Motor Company contract lead
to proliferation of pension plans in unionized industries). See generally Barbash, The Unions and
Negotiated Health and Welfare Plans, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 91, 92-93
(W. Davey, H. Kaltenborn, & S. Ruttenberg eds. 1959) (tracing history of negotiated health and
welfare plans); McConnell, Initial Experience in Operation of Supplemental Unemployment Benefits,
in NEW DIMENSIONS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 73, 80-82 (W. Davey, H. Kahenborn, & S. Rut-
tenberg eds. 1959) (describing supplemental unemployment benefit plans in several union contracts).
See also S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY, & E. LIVERNASH, supra note 352, at 372-489 (detailed history and
description of union negotiated pension plans, health and welfare plans, and other employee fringe
benefits that emerged in 1950s).
361. Aronson, Automation-Challenge to Collective Bargaining? in NEW DIMENSIONS IN COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING 47, 63-64 (W. Davey, H. Kaltenborn, & S. Ruttenberg eds. 1959) (problems
posed by automation are amenable to solution through collective bargaining). One example of bar-
gaining over technological change that received considerable attention was the ILWU-PMA Mechani-
zation and Modernization Agreement of 1960, in which longshoremen gave up hard-won work rules
to permit operators to automate the docks. See L. FAIRLEY, FACING MECHANIZATION: THE WEST
COAST LONGSHORE PLAN at xi-xii (1979). For descriptions and praise of the Agreement, see Cham-
berlain & Kuhn, supra note 358, at 325-26; Fairley, The ILWU-PMA Mechanization and Moderni-
zation Experiment: The Union's Viewpoint, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 34, 34-47 (1963); Horwitz, The ILWU-
PMA Mechanization Agreement: An Experiment in Industrial Relations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SIXTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 22, 22-23
(1963); and Taylor, supra note 339, at 90-91. For a critique of the Agreement from a longshoreman's
point of view, see Weir, The ILWU, A Case Study in Bureaucracy, in AUTOCRACY AND INSURGENCY
IN ORGANIZED LABOR 80 (B. Hall ed. 1972).
362. D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 342-60 (1970) (unions are
expanding their influence into such areas as training and education, work assignments, and should
become involved in job design); S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY, & E. LIVERNASH, supra note 352, at 950
(management's area of discretion diminished by expansion in topics of collective bargaining); see H.
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The problem with this teleological version of industrial pluralism is
that there is nothing in the theory that can explain why the realm of joint
sovereignty will grow rather than shrink . 63 Management is at least as
likely, if not more likely, to attempt to retain unilateral control over as
many areas of decisionmaking as it can, rather than to submit more areas
to collective bargaining, grievance machinery, and arbitration?" Further-
more, the decisions of the Supreme Court, in the Fibreboard,3  Pittsburgh
Plate Glass,3 " and First National Maintenance Corp.367 cases demonstrate
that the realm of bargaining is not infinitely expandable. Arbitral deci-
sional law that creates implied management rights and that recognizes the
defense of business necessity for violations of explicit terms in collective
agreements indicates that arbitrators also place limits on the realm of joint
sovereignty?68 Therefore, the teleological version of industrial pluralism
has no more descriptive plausibility than the initial version of the theory
with which this analysis began.
Both versions of the theory entail a prescription that the industrial
world be treated as autonomous without interference from the larger po-
litical process. The theory thus provides a means to reconcile the tension
between private ownership and political democracy which exists in Amer-
ican life.369 It says that there is no contradiction between those two aspects
of life because the statutory framework for collective bargaining permits
democracy to flourish even in the privately owned industrial world.
These descriptive and prescriptive dimensions of the theory are inter-
twined and must stand or fall together. 370 If there is no equality of power
between management and labor, and if the legal framework that the the-
ory mandates cannot establish true industrial democracy, then the entire
privatized approach to collective bargaining must be questioned. If there is
a structural inequality of power between management and labor based
WELLINGTON, supra note 295, at 76-79 (no restrictions should be placed on scope and topics of collec-
tive bargaining).
363. See, e.g., Goldberg, Bargaining and Productivity in the Pivate Sector, in COLLECTIVE BAR.
GAINING AND PRODUCTIVITY 15, 43 (1975) (Industrial Relations Research Association) (collective bar-
gaining over automation may not work in economy that is not expanding).
364. N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL 2-6 (1948)
(describing management's reluctance to expand realm of collective bargaining).
365. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
366. Allied Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
367. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981).
368. See note 300 supra.
369. R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 343, at 482-83 (pervasive tension exists between
private ownership of industry and goals of democracy); G. MCCONNELL, supra note 30, at 251-55
(discussing problems of legitimacy posed by power of large corporations); see M. HORWlTz, supra
note 262, at 254-55 (nineteenth century formalism attempted to disguise political, redistributive power
of law); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 184-85 (1975) (welfare-corporate state characterized
by conflict between class domination and claims to ideal egalitarian-democratic community).
370. R. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 111-26 (1971) (intricate relationships between de-
scriptive and evaluative aspects of language).
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upon the incidents of private property as the law has defined it, then no
procedural solutions will create true industrial democracy. In that case,
the law must intervene actively to alter the definitions of property rights
in order to create true equality. If such equality is desirable, either to
improve wages, hours, and working conditions, or to affirm workers' dig-
nity, then there must be a new theoretical and doctrinal approach to the
law of labor relations.
The starting point for any new approach is a more accurate description
of the industrial world and a more viable analysis of the impediments to
democracy built into it. Any new theory must also take a position on the
question of whether the wage contract is a purely private concern or a
concern of society as a whole. Industrial pluralism mandates legal ar-
rangements that force workers to fight the daily struggles in the workplace
in an invisible, privatized forum, where each dispute is framed in an indi-
viduated, minute, economistic form. The alternative is to define labor is-
sues as a matter of public concern, and to submit resolution of these issues
to the political process.
This approach would enable workers to struggle in the arena in which
their strength is greatest-the national political arena. At the level of na-
tional economic and political institutions, they could utilize their collective
strength and define their problems in such a way that genuine solutions
would be possible. It is at that level that major decisions about investment
policy, both private and public, are made. In the arena of national politics,
the numerical strength of the working class and its commonality of inter-
ests around these problems would make it a potent force. By keeping
labor disputes out of the political arena, however, industrial pluralism fos-
ters the illusion, so central to pluralist theory in general, that there is no
class conflict in America.
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